Defenders of the indefensible

This article was first published by Tehelka (www.tehelka.com) on 25 September 2014 under the headline "Defenders of the indefensible"


Paralysis grips the armed forces as justice remains elusive in cases of tainted defence deals, says Ramesh Ramachandran

In the infamous Bofors scam, a Swedish investigator said that many innocent people were punished while the guilty got away

Epiphany struck George Fernandes at 11,700 feet on the icy slopes of Siachen Glacier, the world’s highest battlefield, in the eastern Karakoram range of the Himalayas.

Cover of Tehelka magazine, for the week from
24 September 2014 to 4 October 2014

“If there is need for prosecution, there should be prosecution… no matter who. That alone will cleanse the system. In our country, we never prosecute. We institute a case and let it die or let the man (against whom there is a case) die,” Fernandes told Shekhar Gupta in the summer of 2003, when he was defence minister and the latter editor-in-chief of The Indian Express.

Fernandes was replying to a question about how and why there still was no closure to the decades-old Bofors scandal.

That was 2003, but what Fernandes said then rings true even today. There have been many cases, including, but not limited to, the Bofors scam, the HDW submarine scam, Barak missile scam and the Tatra trucks scam, but many of the guilty are yet to be punished, either on account of insufficient evidence or lack of political will or both.

The Price Of Delay

George Fernandes (left) with Shekhar Gupta

As someone who was caught in the eye of a storm following TEHELKA’s exposé, code-named Operation West End, in 2001, Fernandes claimed in his interview to Gupta that bureaucrats would delay making purchases for the armed forces for fear of inviting an adverse reaction or being guillotined, if there was even as much as a whiff of a scam.

It didn’t matter to them that the soldiers, guarding the icy frontiers in Siachen or the searing deserts of Rajasthan, and the defence capabilities could suffer on account of the delay in procurement of, say, a snowmobile or a multirole combat jet. (Compare the reluctance of the officials to make purchases that would help a soldier with the eagerness of the Assam Rifles personnel to take money in lieu of approving a tender.)

“There is hardly any official in the ministry who would like to put his signature for anything that has to be purchased. He would like to postpone it. He would like to put it off. He would like to do whatever he has to do because he thinks that is the best way for him to survive,” Fernandes said, explaining the “psychology” of the bureaucrats in the defence ministry.

But is it not for the political leadership to give the armed forces what they need without worrying about scandals and controversies? Gupta persisted.

To which Fernandes replied: “The court is not going to listen to that, and if a political activist or minister does it, then the man who is his rival is not going to accept that. It is a terrible world.”

The UPA’s decade-long rule saw two defence ministers in Pranab Mukherjee and AK Antony; as it turned out, the latter became the longest-serving defence minister in the history of India, having held the office from 24 October 2006 to 26 May 2014. Much like Manmohan Singh, Antony has the reputation of being honest to a fault, but it is one of life’s ironies that they presided over ministries where scams took place, especially in the UPA’s second term.

 AK Antony copped the blame for stalling
vital military acquisitions

With Antony at the helm, the defence ministry was witness to an unprecedented situation when the chiefs of the armed forces were allegedly involved in one unsavoury incident after another.

If Gen VK Singh dragged the government to court over his age, he also claimed to have been offered a bribe of Rs 14 crore by a retired army officer for clearing the purchase of certain trucks for the army. Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi, now retired, was accused of involvement in the purchase of VVIP helicopters, while Admiral DK Joshi decided to step down after a series of accidents aboard naval warships.

According to Admiral (retd) Raja Menon, Antony ruined India’s defence preparedness by stalling vital military acquisitions. All because he, like some of his predecessors, came to suffer from what is called the Bofors syndrome. “He was unable to take decisions. The problem was his own personality,” says Menon. The bureaucrats, taking a cue from Antony, chose not to decide one way or another. Consequently, no one spared a thought for the soldier at the frontier or cared for India’s national security imperatives.

Whither Justice

The investigation into various scams left much to be desired, too. Similar to the officers and contractors in Operation Hilltop, the Tatra trucks case allegedly involved certain unscrupulous individuals who pocketed a certain percentage of the total cost of the purchase.

Recently, the CBI filed a closure report in this case, involving the State-owned beml (Bharat Earth Movers Limited) and Tatra Vectra Motors Limited, a joint venture between the UK-based Vectra Group and Tatra Trucks of the Czech Republic, on the grounds of “insufficient prosecutable evidence”.

Gen VK Singh (Retd)

Similarly, the Sukna land scam was in the news four years ago for a no-objection certificate given to a private builder for constructing an educational institution on a plot of land near the Sukna cantonment area. An Armed Forces Tribunal, which inquired into the matter, recently quashed the court martial of an officer, but the controversy refuses to die down with the Union minister of state for development of north-eastern region (independent charge), Gen VK Singh, himself a former army chief, describing the verdict as “dubious”.

In the case of the VVIP helicopter deal, too, money had changed hands. In 2013, Antony accepted as much, saying: “Yes, corruption has taken place in the helicopter deal and bribes have been taken.” Antony didn’t hazard a guess on the outcome of the various investigations that were going on except for saying that defence procurement almost always seems to be beset with controversies and that even an Integrity Pact for vendors was proving to be inadequate for checking malpractices. He wanted the Central Vigilance Commission to be roped in along with independent external monitors to plug the loopholes in procurement.

The words of Sten Lindstrom, a former head of police in Sweden who investigated the Bofors deal, should serve as a chilling reminder to one and all. In an interview to Chitra Subramaniam, which was published by the New Delhibased website The Hoot, Lindstrom said, “Many Indian institutions were tarred, innocent people were punished while the guilty got away.”

Also, in an apparent reference to the Indian authorities, he told Subramaniam, who exposed the Bofors scam: “Can you imagine a situation where no one from India met the real investigators of the gun deal? That was when we saw the extent to which everyone was compromised. Many politicians who had come to my office claiming they would move heaven and earth to get at the truth if they came to power, fell silent when they held very important positions directly linked to the deal.”

India and its soldiers deserve better.

Scam After Scam

A quick lowdown on defence scams in Independent India would take us back to 1948 when the Jeep scam took place. The focus was on VK Krishna Menon, the then Indian high commissioner in London, who finalised a deal with a foreign firm for around 1,500 jeeps without following the normal procedure. India required around 4,600 jeeps for its Kashmir operations. Nine months later, in 1949, 155 jeeps of poor quality reached Madras. The scam amount, which has not been officially revealed till date, was around Rs 80 lakh. The aftermath was ironic. In 1956, Menon was inducted into Jawaharlal Nehru’s Cabinet.

1987 - HDW SUBMARINE SCAM

Deal In 1981, India bought four submarines from the German company HDW. In 1987, it asked for two more

How was it exposed When India asked for a discount on the fresh order of two submarines, the shipyard declined, saying it had to pay a 7 percent commission. VP Singh heard about it when he was defence minister in the Rajiv Gandhi government. In March 1990, when VP Singh was the prime minister, he ordered an investigation

Kickbacks Rs 20 crore

Aftermath The case was closed in 2005

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

1987 - Bofors Scam

Deal 400 155-mm field howitzer guns worth Rs 6,994 crore were bought from Swedish company Bofors

How was it exposed Swedish National Radio reported that bribes had been paid to top Indian politicians to secure the howitzer gun contract. Geneva-based journalist Chitra Subramaniam did an investigation

Kickbacks Rs 64 crore

Suspects AE Services, the shell company operated by Italian businessman Ottavio Quattrocchi, a family friend of Rajiv and Sonia Gandhi, who also represented the petrochemical firm Snamprogetti, suddenly intervened in the Bofors deal on 15 November 1985. At that time Bofors had existing contractual arrangements (going back several years, even decades) with two strands of companies in which arms agent Win Chadha and the Hinduja brothers — GP Hinduja and Srichand Hinduja — had interests

Aftermath Over two decades, 250 crore was spent in the investigation, but it was inconclusive. Swedish investigator Sten Lindstrom said Rajiv himself did not receive any pay-offs in the deal, but that Quattrocchi received commissions. Lindstrom also confirmed that Rajiv knew of and was complicit in the elaborate cover-up that his government orchestrated to protect Quattrocchi

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

2002 - Coffin Scam

Deal The Central government bought 500 coffins, each costing $2,500

Scam It turned out the real price was $172 per coffin. To make matters worse, the quality was very poor

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

2005 - Denel Scam

Deal Denel, a South African governmentcontrolled company, supplied antimaterial rifles to the Indian Army

How was it exposed Allegations emerged in South Africa that Denel had paid bribes to Varas Associates, the alleged intermediary, for the Indian contract

Kickbacks Rs 20 crore

Aftermath The CBI filed a closure report in September 2013. The agency claimed to have received responses of judicial requests from South Africa, the UK, Isle of Man and Switzerland, which did not show any evidence that could substantiate the allegations of corruption

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

2006 - Barak Missile Scam

Deal Seven Barak missile systems costing Rs 1,150 crore were bought from Israel

How was it exposed Former president APJ Abdul Kalam, who was the scientific adviser to the prime minster when the deal was being negotiated, had opposed the weapons system. The CBI registered an FIR in the case, questioning why the system was purchased even after the DRDO had raised its objections in 2006

Kickbacks NA

Aftermath Former treasurer of the Samata Party RK Jain was arrested but no major breakthrough in probe till date. The CBI has closed at least one of the cases for lack of evidence

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

2007 - NTRO Scam

Deal Hyderabad-based National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), an intelligence agency working under the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister’s Office, bought Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)

How was it exposed The Comptroller and Auditor General said rules were flouted in the purchase of UAVs from Israel Aerospace Industries

Kickbacks Rs 450 crore

Aftermath A letter was sent to the then National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon complaining of the irregularities in the recruitment of officers in the NTRO. It was said the probe was handed over to the man who was accused in the first place

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

2007 - Ration Supplies Scam

It was discovered that numbers were being fudged while supplying rations to army personnel posted in high-altitude areas. Army Service Corps chief Lt Gen SK Sahni was found guilty of corruption and dismissed from service

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

2007 - Frozen Meat Scam

Army Service Corps officer Lt Gen SK Dahiya was indicted in a case involving irregularities in the procurement of frozen meat for troops posted in Ladakh and discrepancies in procurement of dry rations

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

2008 - Abhishek Verma Scandal

Abhishek Verma, the son of former MP Srikant Verma, is in jail, and he and his wife are accused of stealing defence secrets and accepting bribes from defence firms. Investigations are continuing into the affairs of Verma, who may have also had a role in the VVIP helicopter deal. Over the past five years, Verma is said to have made a comeback to the defence consultancy business and re-established his contacts. Some highly classified defence ministry files have made their way to his firm Ganton. The secret files relate to the IAF’s acquisition plans. He has unsuccessfully tried to flaunt his proximity to several politicians from the top Congress leadership down to Jagdish Tytler

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

2009 - OFB Scam

Deal Former Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) chief Sudipto Ghosh and several of his associates were accused of fixing contracts

Aftermath After the CBI found evidence of bribery, the government in March 2012 blacklisted six companies for 10 years: Singapore Technologies, Israeli Military Industries, Germany’s Rheinmetall Air Defence, Russian firm Corporation Defence, Indian firms TS Kisan & Company and RK Machine Tool

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

2009 - Sukna Land Scam

Two senior lieutenant generals and a major general were accused of converting a 70-acre land adjacent to Sukna military station in Siliguri, West Bengal, into an educational institution by handing it over to a private trust. The controversy involved issuing of no-objection certificate for the private trust to buy the land for construction of the educational institution on the condition that wards of army personnel from the military station would get to study there. The then army chief Gen Deepak Kapoor’s military secretary Lt Gen Avadesh Prakash and the then 33 Corps commander Lt Gen PK Rath were indicted in the case. Lt Gen Rath has since been acquitted of all charges by an Armed Forces Tribunal Bench. A court martial dismissed Lt Gen Avadesh Prakash from service after finding him guilty in the case

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

2010 - VVIP Chopper Scam

Deal In 2010, Anglo-Italian helicopter manufacturer AgustaWestland agreed to supply 12 VVIP choppers to the Indian Air Force for Rs 3,600 crore

How was it exposed An Italian intelligence agency started to investigate the deal on the suspicion of corruption

Kickbacks AgustaWestland paid a commission of more than Rs 350 crore to a Switzerland-based consultant

Aftermath The head of the company was arrested in Milan

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

2011 - Adarsh Society Scam

In 2001, land was allotted to the widows of personnel killed in the Kargil War and retired defence personnel. Over a period of 10 years, top politicians and bureaucrats bent several rules, committed various acts of commission and omission, and finally, got themselves allotted with flats at a much cheaper cost

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

2014 - Tatra Trucks Scam

Deal Bengaluru-based Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) bought components from Czech company Tatra for its all-terrain vehicles, which are the backbone of the army’s artillery and transportation wings. The BEML was accused of flouting guidelines by buying components for the 6×6 and 8×8 trucks from a middleman in London

How was it exposed Army chief Gen VK Singh told the the defence minister that he was offered a bribe of Rs 14 crore

Kickbacks Rs 750 crore in bribes and commissions

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HOW A DEFENCE DEAL IS SIGNED

• Contracts worth more than Rs 500 crore have to be cleared by the Cabinet Committee on Security. The armed forces have financial powers of Rs 150 crore

• The military formulates a qualitative requirement of the weapon it wants

• The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), headed by the defence minister, accepts or rejects the necessity for the proposed procurement

• The DAC approval is followed by the ministry floating a global tender

• The Technical Evaluation Committee studies the technical bids and shortlists them for trial

• Field trials are carried out by the user service, which then recommends those that meet requirements

• The Technical Oversight Committee scrutinises the procedure to ensure fair trial and selection was done

• The Contract Negotiation Committee recommends conclusion of a contract at a negotiated price. The proposal is sent to the Cabinet Committee on Security, headed by the prime minister, for approval after which a contract is signed

Declassify 1962 India-China war report, reappraise the civil – military relations

The release of a portion of the ‘top secret’ T.B. Henderson Brooks – Premindra Singh Bhagat inquiry report on the 1962 India-China war by an Australian journalist Neville Maxwell has come at a time when the civil – military relations are under the scanner all over again, due in no small part to the allegedly inappropriate conduct of a former Chief of Army Staff who dragged the government to court over his age row and how an otherwise routine movement of troops coinciding with the date of court hearing gave rise to fears in the government of a possible ‘coup’; the unseemly controversy surrounding the frequent crashes by Soviet-era MiG fighter jets; and most recently, a series of naval mishaps that eventually led to the resignation of the Navy chief Admiral DK Joshi.

Let us look at the substantive portions of the 126-page section of the report that was released online by Neville Maxwell, who was the Delhi correspondent of the Times of London during the war. For one, the report squarely attributes the debacle to an unsound military plan. It goes on to blame the then army leadership, the intelligence apparatus, the bureaucrats in the ministries of defence and external affairs, and the political class, not necessarily in that order, for the humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese. The army leadership, for overruling the field commanders; the intelligence chief, for assuming, erroneously, that the Chinese would not resort to use of force; and the then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership, for pushing for a ‘Forward Policy’ of establishing military outposts in areas claimed by China and launching aggressive patrols without the necessary army wherewithal.

The report notes, among other things, the following:

* The government who politically must have been keen to recover territory advocated a cautious policy whilst Army HQ dictated a policy that was clearly militarily unsound.

* The Chief of Army Staff did not present the correct military assessment to the political leadership on the forward policy in spite of the fact that the military intelligence believed that China would retaliate against any move by India to reclaim territory.

* A meeting was held in the Prime Minister’s Office on 2 November 1961 which was attended among others by the defence minister, the foreign secretary, the Chief of Army Staff and the director Intelligence Bureau (DIB). It appears that the DIB was of the opinion that the Chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and that they were not likely to use force against any of our posts even if they were in a position to do so.

The Ministry of Defence has sought to take refuge under the pretext that the inquiry committee report remains top secret because of the extremely sensitive nature of its contents “which are of current operational value.” Some scholars have debunked the government’s claim, saying that declassification of the report would not hinder or jeopardise in any manner the contemporary political and military attitudes and affairs. On the contrary, they have argued, it was necessary in the interest of generating an open and honest debate in the country about the circumstances leading up to the war so that the right lessons could be drawn. It has been pointed out that the government ought to take the nation into confidence and encourage a critical analysis of what went wrong and how to avoid a repetition in the future. As a newspaper editorial said, “There needs, instead, be a thorough reading of the report and the manner of its eventual public availability for a tutorial on India’s inexplicably ostrich-like approach to archival material. If today we are reacting to the report as if it were still 1963, given the lack of clarity on military assessment of operational details, it reflects the state’s reluctance to allow access to material essential for proper history writing, the kind of history without which there cannot be coherent and informed public debate.”

The release of a section of the report is a wake-up call of sorts for the Indian political and military leadership. To quote a former diplomat Hardeep S Puri, “The contents of the report point to three extremely disturbing trends that were in evidence in the 1960s. Some of these have continuing relevance even 52 years later. These merit a full national debate in order to prevent the recurrence of a 1962-type fiasco. They relate to a continuing civil-military disconnect, serious gaps in training and provisioning of equipment, inadequate or flawed intelligence which contributed to bizarre decision-making at the army headquarters and by the political leadership in the ministries of defence and external affairs, and at the PMO.”

India would do well to reappraise its civil – military relations unless, of course, it wants to go down the path that George Santayana so eloquently warned against: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

REMOVE THE BLINKERS

This article was published by Asia Times Online (www.atimes.com) on 17 October 2013 under the headline: "Singh takes a lonely road on Pakistan". Here is the link to it.


Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in a bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif in
New York on 29 September 2013 (Pictures courtesy: www.pmindia.nic.in)

New Delhi
16 October 2013

The Prime Minister of India met with his Pakistan counterpart on the margins of the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 29 September 2013, defying public sentiment and in spite of an overwhelming body of evidence of Pakistan’s complicity in allowing its territory to be used for mounting terrorist attacks against India and Indian interests, at home and abroad alike. The discourse leading up to the meeting was dominated by whether the talks should at all be held in the immediate backdrop of the 26 September 2013 twin terror attacks in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in which Indian soldiers, police personnel and civilians were killed. It was not an isolated incident: In January this year an Indian soldier was beheaded at the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan; in August five more Indian soldiers were killed; and, in between, several more such killings and infiltrations were reported. As it became known later, the Indian Army was engaged in an operation to repulse an attempt from the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) to push a tranche of infiltrators across the Line of Control even as the two premiers shook hands and posed for the cameras. It took the army a fortnight to successfully conclude the anti-infiltration operation. If the government dithered on calling Pakistan’s bluff, the army chief made it eminently clear to anyone who would care to listen that it is impossible for terrorists to carry out any activity along the LoC without the knowledge of the Pakistani Army.

By the Indian government’s own admission, the expectations from the New York talks had to be toned down given the terror arm which is still active in the Indian subcontinent. And as it predictably turned out, there was not much to show by way of outcomes except for the two sides deciding to task their respective Directors-General of Military Operations (DGMOs) to meet for suggesting effective means to restore the ceasefire. Even that looks remote now. The two DGMOs last met in 1999 although they speak fairly regularly. The New York meeting could at best be described as a photo-op. If anything, it once again reaffirmed Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s, and by extension his government’s, adamantly consistent but questionable position on talks with Pakistan. After the 26 November 2008 Mumbai attacks, too, he had similarly disregarded public opinion to first meet with the then President of Pakistan at Yekaterinburg in Russia on the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, and later with the then Prime Minister of Pakistan at the Red Sea resort of Sharm-el-Sheikh in Egypt on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit. It was at Sharm-el-Sheikh that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his team agreed to a joint statement with Pakistan that said: “Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue Process and these should not be bracketed”. Also, in another first, Balochistan was allowed to creep into the text of an India - Pakistan joint statement. Pakistan has since conveniently used the bogey of Indian involvement in stirring up trouble in Balochistan as a stock response to India’s assertions of a Pakistani hand in fomenting unrest in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

All of which begs the question: Talks to what end, and at what cost? Is the life of an Indian – be it a soldier or a civilian — so cheap that talks with Pakistan should continue at any cost and in spite of a spate of terrorist attacks, as evidenced most recently in the twin terror attacks in the Samba and Kathua sectors of Jammu and Kashmir? How many more brave Indian soldiers should be killed in cowardly terrorist attacks before the decision-making apparatuses of the government proactively seek out the military’s views? How many more families should lose their loved ones at the hands of the terrorists and their masters outside our borders before the government of the day begins to pay heed to the sentiments of the common man whom it claims to represent? Why are no visible attempts being made to restore the delicate civil-military balance and to uphold the dignity and morale of the soldier? Instead, what we are witnessing today is a government that is playing with fire and it needs to stop now. External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid has since clarified that while the two Prime Ministers met in New York the stage has not been reached where the two sides have indicated any dates, timeline or perspective on resuming the dialogue. And with a post-2014 Afghanistan looming large on the horizon it is anyone’s guess as to how much time and effort Pakistan, given its proclivities, will be willing to spare and/or invest in preserving the incremental peace dividends and insulating the bilateral relationship from external influences.



Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in a bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister of
Pakistan Nawaz Sharif in New York on 29 September 2013. Also seen in the picture
(on the right) are External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, National Security
Adviser Shivshankar Menon and Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh

What the discerning stakeholders in India today need be understand is that this government’s blind faith in dialogue with Pakistan has not disproved those who have little or no faith in talks under the present circumstances. The history of India – Pakistan bilateral engagement over the past decade and more is replete with an unending series of terrorist attacks interspersed with peace talks, an overwhelming majority of which were held in third countries on the margins of multilateral summits. The New York meeting is but one in a long list of bilateral engagements starting with the 2006 NAM summit at Havana in Cuba, the 2008 Asia –Europe Meeting (ASEM) at Beijing in China, the 2008 United Nations General Assembly session in New York, the 2009 SCO summit at Yekaterinburg in Russia, the 2009 NAM summit at Sharm-el-Sheikh and the 2010 SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) summit at Thimphu in Bhutan. Add to it former Pakistan President Gen Pervez Musharraf’s visit to New Delhi in 2005 and former Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s visit to Mohali in 2011 for watching cricket or the private visits by Pakistani heads of state/government to Ajmer and you have a veritably uninterrupted dialogue that can be traced further back to Lahore, 1999; Agra, 2001; and Islamabad, 2004. Importantly, these bilateral engagements have survived multiple terrorist attacks and conflicts dating back to Kargil and Kandahar in 1999, Parliament in 2001, Mumbai train bombings of 2006 and the 26/11 terrorist attacks again in Mumbai, in 2008. But what has come of the talks so far? Are we any closer to a breakthrough than we were before? Have terrorist attacks diminished appreciably? Unfortunately, after every terrorist attack the government of the day mouths platitudes and employs boilerplate language such as ‘It cannot be business as usual’ or ‘Patience is not inexhaustible’ only to go back on them at the first available opportunity! This government has tied itself in knots over its Pakistan policy but it has only itself to blame for it. Its inability to think out of the box has exposed its bankruptcy of ideas on how to deal with an increasingly intransigent neighbour. And Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s personal quest for a lasting legacy insofar as Pakistan is concerned has only further compounded an already intractable conundrum.

The government needs to remove its blinkers and begin to appreciate that terrorism and talks cannot go hand in hand. It is imperative that the government shows zero tolerance to terrorism, takes strong steps to prevent terror attacks and imposes costs on the perpetrators of terrorism. Most importantly, the government must heed public opinion. The time has come for the government to start calling Pakistan’s bluff, to act firmly and decisively and if that involves putting a moratorium on future talks with Pakistan at the highest level, “so be it.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has used this specific language before, albeit to a domestic audience in the run up to the India – United States nuclear cooperation agreement in his first term in office when the Left parties parted ways with the UPA; there is no reason why in the instant context Pakistan cannot be told “So be it”; that India will be free to pursue its course of action if Pakistan does not intend to reciprocate peace overtures; and that consequences will follow if it does not give satisfaction to India on what India considers to be its core interests. Saying no to talks now is not the same as saying no to talks ever and it certainly need not necessarily mean or come to represent an escalation of tensions. A range of other equally effective options is available to the government of the day to execute its Pakistan policy and these must be explored. Above all, the government must forge the broadest possible national consensus on the way forward for a détente with Pakistan.