Showing posts with label Manmohan Singh. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Manmohan Singh. Show all posts

Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif must develop personal chemistry for India-Pakistan peace to succeed: Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri

This article was first published by Tehelka (www.tehelka.com) on 21 November 2014 under the headline So Near And Yet So Far.

INTERVIEW
Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri (Pix courtesy: Vijay Pandey)
For someone who was privy to the delicate details of the protracted India-Pakistan back-channel talks that straddled two governments in India, that of former prime ministers Manmohan Singh and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri would rather hide than reveal and understandably so. Given the sensitivities, neither country would want the painstaking effort that went into the talks to become a casualty of negative public perceptions without first preparing the ground for a grand reconciliation. However, the former Pakistani foreign minister wants the broad contours of the talks to be put on record and debated in the interest of a lasting peace on the Indian subcontinent. “I hope the current BJP government will give some thought to why Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee had concluded that talks should be the way forward,” he tells Ramesh Ramachandran in an exclusive interview.

Edited excerpts from the interview:

Your visit to India comes before a likely meeting between the leaders of India and Pakistan on the margins of the SAARC summit in Kathmandu. Also the anniversary of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks is coming up. Given that backdrop, how do you see the bilateral discourse or engagement evolving?
As somebody who has dealt with these issues for a very long time, I hope and pray that the two prime ministers meet and this despite the fact that I do not belong to Mr Nawaz Sharif’s party. I talk as a Pakistani. It is in our interest that the talks take place and I think Mr Vajpayee, the wise man of BJP, had gone through a lot of political journey before he reached the conclusion that he did. Nobody could be a better patriot than Mr Vajpayee. Nobody could doubt his wisdom. Nobody could doubt his loyalty to the BJP. So, he must have gone through a lot of experience, a lot of thought process, for him to reach the conclusion that he did. And that’s why he started the process and that’s why history will always accord that to him. We are lucky that Dr Manmohan Singh’s government followed it through. Previously, by the way, we were not certain that it would happen. So, when the BJP lost, we were very uncertain about the fate of the process that was begun by him would be. So, all I will say is that I hope the current BJP government will perhaps give some thought to why Mr Vajpayee had reached the conclusion that he did. Secondly, we have tried everything… war… near wars… nuclearisation; everything has been tried. I mean are we going to live like this? I think if you talk to a sane Indian privately, he is very angry with what Pakistan is perceived to have done. But when he is in a cooler moment, he says, after all, as Vajpayee rightly said, you can’t change your neighbours and we can’t change ours. There were people, by the way, not just in India, who said that they did not want to have anything to do with Pakistan; a lot of people in Pakistan said they did not want to have anything to do with India; that Pakistan is in the Muslim world… they were thrilled when the Americans came forward with the idea of an extended Middle East and included Pakistan in it. Now they can continue to extend the Middle East as much as they want but geography will not change. So, any Pakistani in his right mind will understand that he can be a part of the Muslim world or whatever he wants to be… he can be part of the Ummah but he can’t escape geography. And I go further as a positivist. I believe it is good for Pakistan. And I’m sure that there are a lot of good Indians who think it is good for India; that India, despite being a much bigger country than Pakistan, can achieve its potential truly when there is peace in the neighbourhood. And this is something that the Indians have said… Indian leaders are saying… I am not putting words in their mouth… they said it themselves. So, I think, keeping that in mind, let’s hope that the two prime ministers meet.

The India-Pakistan talks have a start-stop pattern to them. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s invitation to Nawaz Sharif for his swearing-in ceremony was followed by the cancellation of foreign secretary-level talks and, more recently, ceasefire violations across the Line of Control and the international border in Jammu and Kashmir. Is the atmosphere any more conducive for talks?
Let me put a counter question to those who put a question like this. When the peace process was serious, was ever a gun fired in the 2003-04 period? Not a single bullet was fired. So, I mean, the two things are linked. I agree entirely with Mani Shankar Aiyar when he talks about uninterrupted and uninterruptible dialogue… that’s, in fact, the reason why I support (a dialogue) because that is the nature of our relationship. And, of course, the famous Vietnamese bombing… the meeting in a Paris hotel between the Vietnamese negotiator and Henry Kissinger was not interrupted in spite of the bombing that was inflicted on the Vietnamese people, including phosphorous bomb, and you have seen the horrid photograph of the child burning… it is etched in my memory. So, when you talk of the state of the Pakistan-India relationship, it cannot be worse than that because no Pakistani or Indian government has in any war tried to burn people alive. I mean, to my knowledge, we have never used phosphorus. Both (India and Pakistan) have fought against each other and treated each other’s prisoners humanely. So, let’s look at the way we are different from a lot of other countries, luckily. Let’s build on it and my own feeling is that this is a temporary setback. I think Prime Minister Modi’s basic purpose is to develop India. This is what his winning slogan was and the people of India bought into it. He will have to deliver on it if he has to win the next election. In fact, in order to keep their aspirations, expectations and hopes alive, that they are not dashed, he will have to deliver and I don’t want to say anything more than what I am going to say to you. For that to be achieved to its full potential, there has to be peace in the neighbourhood. I have not seen any country develop, unless you are the United States of America, and have the capacity to literally do whatever you want to do with any other country and get away with it, but even they have paid a price. America has not got away with it. It has paid a major price for what it did to Iran and Afghanistan. Today, China has either overtaken or will overtake the American economy. Why? Because of these very distractions. So, it remains true that you need peace around if you want to develop.

There was a lot of talk about a ‘Four-Point Formula’ when Manmohan Singh and Gen Pervez Musharraf were in power. It envisioned cross-LoC movement of people, phased withdrawal of armed forces, a new model of governance and a joint mechanism for carrying the process forward. In your estimation, is that a template that governments in India and Pakistan can and must work upon?
You see, there are a lot of thoughts that I am going to say in my book. Why did we arrive at that (formula)? It’s easy to write in four lines about a four-point formula but there was a good reason: The Kashmiris didn’t wish to be divided. So, we wanted a joint mechanism where Kashmir won’t be divided. For the first time, it gave some experience to the Pakistani and the Indian leadership to interact with each other in a conducive and a productive manner, instead of trying one-upmanship in the United Nations fora. I know, I used to be thrilled when I used to be leading the Pakistani delegation because I saw young Pakistani foreign service officers work extra hard to get one paragraph brought into a NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) statement, about which I mention in my book. After keeping awake the whole night, they would tell me, ‘We have won a great victory, Sir.’ I’m sure the Indians were trying their best to ensure that the paragraph should not be included… (which talked about) a distinction between ‘terrorism’ and ‘war of independence’. What difference did it make? I used to then ask our young boys about the effort that they had made because ground reality does not change. You have to deal with India; it is your neighbour, a much bigger neighbour. What were we aiming at? A just peace. By the way, in the absence of a just peace, as I remarked to other people, even if one side wins, nothing can happen. The other won’t accept it; it will wait for a better day. That’s what happened to Germany and the result was Adolf Hitler. So, therefore, I think what we started, and I have staunchly believe and I have never changed my mind on that just as Mani Shankar Aiyar doesn’t change his mind, what’s more important for the current government is the journey — intellectual and mental journey — that Mr Vajpayee went through.

Like it or not, a lot more depends on personalities than systems or processes in the Indian subcontinent. Do you think personal chemistry matters, too? How important is it or will be for a dialogue among political leaders such as a Modi in India and a Sharif in Pakistan? Is there a critical mass on both sides to take the peace process forward?
You will be surprised that I devote an ­entire chapter in my book to personal relationships and Mani also figures in it. I strongly believe in it. It matters but is it a Berlin Wall that you cannot overcome? Not at all. My way of dealing with the Indians was first to accept that they are as human as I am. Their instincts are the same as mine. I was able to ­convince them… at least three foreign ministers of India I dealt with… that they could take me at my word, that I would do my best. I was not a dictator of Pakistan, but they knew if I made a commitment I will try my best. Human relationships matter, but it doesn’t mean human relationships are always among people of similar backgrounds. People who are entrusted vast responsibilities by their nations are ­under extraordinary compulsions to ­actually break the Berlin Wall and try and develop that empathy, because in the absence of that empathy I agree with you it’s very difficult to do any constructive work. If perpetually you are thinking the other ­fellow is out to do you in, then it won’t work. So I think Prime Ministers Modi and Sharif or whoever comes to power in Pakistan, they must develop that chemistry. But that is not going to happen overnight. Sometimes you (know some people)… Mani Shankar Aiyar and I knew each other but it doesn’t mean that I knew every interlocutor of mine. I didn’t know Natwar Singh or Pranab Mukherjee but I developed very good chemistry with them. They knew they wanted to serve India’s cause, I wanted to serve Pakistan’s cause. We have to first convince that our cause was not so completely in conflict. What was the common factor? The 600 million people living below the poverty line while the Chinese have lifted 600 million above the poverty line. The ­Chinese were behind Pakistan and India in 1949; this is something that we should try and emulate.

If I were to now talk about the domestic politics in Pakistan, we see your party and its leader Imran Khan agitating and mobilising public opinion against the Sharif government. Where do you think the domestic political discourse in Pakistan lies vis-à-vis India?
Here’s the good news. Nobody can contradict me. And I put it in my book. I have quoted him (Imran Khan), so when he comes to power, all those speeches of him will be quoted back to him. I have said in the book the areas where I disagree with Imran Khan but the area where I entirely agree with him is on India. And there are many statements that I have quoted and hopefully Imran means what he says and I have no doubt that he means what he says. I have seen a lot of goodwill for him in India, by the way. Although some people may not agree with his current politics, they have goodwill for him as a person. So, my own feeling is that Imran wants peace with India. He wants a just peace, as I do. And then I did something clever. I actually briefed him before he was going to Mirpur to deliver a speech. He went on record that I have briefed him and he supports that. I’m interested in making sure that it comes in my book. So, that means that the next government after Nawaz Sharif’s will be our government.

So, am I correct in presuming that you remain an incorrigible optimist about the India-Pakistan peace process?
As I said, I have no option; the other is a disaster I am not prepared to confront. And for the Pakistan-India relationship with the history that it has, you have to be an optimist. But it’s not that I am a foolish optimist. I am an optimist based on what I saw at close hand. I could see people regarded as hawks like Brajesh Mishra (the late national security adviser) meeting me in Munich; we interacted as human beings. We have had hawks on the Pakistani side. Hawk or whatever, everybody is human on the inside. The point is to touch the right chord and everybody should know, Indians and Pakistanis, that beyond a certain point the other side cannot be pushed. If you realise that, no mountain is insurmountable.

So, the moment that came some few years ago is not entirely lost. Peace is eminently possible and doable?
Whenever there are statesmen in power, hopefully soon; if unfortunately not soon, whenever; they will have a blueprint before them. They will know this is the bottom line for both the governments. Beyond that neither government will relent. So, the good thing is that the work that has been done is on record. There’s no poker anymore. You can’t pretend to ask for the moon because the other side already knows what you have agreed and this is institutional memory by the way. Regardless of posturing, it remains in institutional memory. I can’t believe that Dr Manmohan Singh was not consulting the Indian Army and somebody in the (Indian) foreign office must have been in his confidence.

In hindsight, do you think Manmohan Singh erred in not seizing the moment and travelling to Pakistan in 2006?
It was just bad luck. You had elections in Uttar Pradesh and some other states. I wish he had come (to Pakistan)… hindsight, they say, is 20/20. If I think Dr Manmohan knew what was going to happen in March 2007, he would have strained extra hard despite the elections. So, I give him benefit of the doubt. I didn’t know what was going to happen in March (the protests by lawyers after Musharraf suspended the chief justice of Pakistan’s supreme court), so why should Manmohan Singh have known? I thought we were there for the next five years. That’s the next thing I have learnt in politics. Never make that mistake. When for the first time my name was mentioned as foreign minister, I accompanied Asghar Khan to Tehran and they thought he would be the prime minister and I would be foreign minister… this was several decades ago. And we were with the Shah of Iran and I say in the book how he was holding forth on Mozambique to Angola but didn’t know a thing that was happening in Tehran. And five months after we met, he was out. And he was at the height of his power. With all the American might behind him, the Americans didn’t provide him (Shah of Iran) with land for a grave. He had to go to Egypt to be buried. So, things change dramatically.

* * * * * * *

SO NEAR AND YET SO FAR
Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri thought “Interrupted Symphony” should be a good title for his forthcoming book about India-Pakistan relations, but settled for Neither Hawk Nor Dove on the advice of his publisher.

The former Pakistani foreign minister, who has since joined Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, would not reveal whether he was inspired in part by how he found in a relative hawk like Brajesh Mishra, the late national security adviser to former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a reliable and honest interlocutor. “My book sends a hard message to Pakistan but delivered softly to India,” is all he would venture to say.

Kasuri, 73, recalls with great fondness and detail that the two nuclear-armed South Asian neighbours had come “very near” to an agreed framework on the Kashmir issue when Manmohan Singh and Pervez Musharraf were in power. Kasuri would know for he served as Pakistan’s foreign minister between 2002 and 2007; he was among a handful of persons on either side who have seen the contours of the back-channel talks between India and Pakistan start and evolve, only to be put in a deep freeze as, like most things in the subcontinent, the political climate changed without notice.

“Sir Creek was a signature away,” he says at a luncheon hosted by his dear friend Mani Shankar Aiyar in New Delhi, with a tinge of sadness mixed with exasperation at the glacial pace at which this roller-coaster of a peace process has meandered from the time both sides sat down for meetings, including in third countries, in order to gain an appreciation of each other’s bottom line. (Sir Creek is an estuary of about 100 km in the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat, which forms a maritime boundary with Pakistan’s Sindh province.)

The paradox is unmistakable: India and Pakistan had come very close to a resolution of the Kashmir issue at a time when their bilateral ties were at their frostiest, following the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament and the 1999 Kargil conflict before that. Alluding to former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s remark about “balanced dissatisfaction” as a possible means to resolving the Ukraine crisis, Kasuri insists that the personalities involved in the India-Pakistan back-channel talks could claim with a degree of pride and satisfaction to have achieved “better than balanced dissatisfaction” and arrived at a template that could easily be sold to various stakeholders in both countries, including, but not limited to, the peoples and legislatures. “Hundred percent (agreement) was never possible,” he says, adding on a note of caution that a minuscule “religious right” in Pakistan might not relent.

A strong votary of Congress parliamentarian Aiyar’s push for an “uninterrupted and uninterruptible” dialogue between India and Pakistan, Kasuri says it behoves of the prime ministers of both countries to renew political and diplomatic contacts when they grace the 18th SAARC summit to be hosted by Nepal on 26 November, which, incidentally, will mark the sixth anniversary of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks.

This year’s summit will be held after a three-year gap; the last summit was hosted by Maldives in 2011. While some South Asian diplomats cite this anomaly to question the efficacy of SAARC as a regional grouping, some others believe that the eight-member bloc could be meeting too frequently (annually, in the case of SAARC, where the member-states host it in the alphabetical order) for its own good.

Sheel Kant Sharma, a former Indian diplomat and a former secretary-general of SAARC, feels that the annual summits attended by the heads of state or government leave their respective bureaucracies with little or no time to act upon or follow up on the declaration adopted towards the end of a summit.

Gowher Rizvi, the international affairs adviser to Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, suspects the SAARC has been “designed not to succeed” given how underfunded it is and how more attention could be paid to strengthening its secretariat. Rizvi, who was recently in New Delhi, said at an event organised by a privately-run think-tank that the SAARC secretary-general’s post should be elevated to a ministerial rank in order to allow greater access to the political leaderships of the member-states. Shyam Saran, the chairman of the National Security Advisory Board and a former foreign secretary, in turn, feels that India should take the lead to make SAARC work.

The first SAARC summit was held in Dhaka in 1985. At the time, it had Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as its members. Since then, it has grown to include Afghanistan as a full member and many more countries and multilateral organisations as its observers.

India-Pakistan peace: So Near And Yet So Far

This article was first published by Tehelka (www.tehelka.com) on 21 November 2014 under the headline So Near And Yet So Far.

Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri (Pix courtesy: Vijay Pandey)
Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri thought “Interrupted Symphony” should be a good title for his forthcoming book about India-Pakistan relations, but settled for Neither Hawk Nor Dove on the advice of his publisher.

The former Pakistani foreign minister, who has since joined Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, would not reveal whether he was inspired in part by how he found in a relative hawk like Brajesh Mishra, the late national security adviser to former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a reliable and honest interlocutor. “My book sends a hard message to Pakistan but delivered softly to India,” is all he would venture to say.

Kasuri, 73, recalls with great fondness and detail that the two nuclear-armed South Asian neighbours had come “very near” to an agreed framework on the Kashmir issue when Manmohan Singh and Pervez Musharraf were in power. Kasuri would know for he served as Pakistan’s foreign minister between 2002 and 2007; he was among a handful of persons on either side who have seen the contours of the back-channel talks between India and Pakistan start and evolve, only to be put in a deep freeze as, like most things in the subcontinent, the political climate changed without notice.

“Sir Creek was a signature away,” he says at a luncheon hosted by his dear friend Mani Shankar Aiyar in New Delhi, with a tinge of sadness mixed with exasperation at the glacial pace at which this roller-coaster of a peace process has meandered from the time both sides sat down for meetings, including in third countries, in order to gain an appreciation of each other’s bottom line. (Sir Creek is an estuary of about 100 km in the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat, which forms a maritime boundary with Pakistan’s Sindh province.)

The paradox is unmistakable: India and Pakistan had come very close to a resolution of the Kashmir issue at a time when their bilateral ties were at their frostiest, following the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament and the 1999 Kargil conflict before that. Alluding to former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s remark about “balanced dissatisfaction” as a possible means to resolving the Ukraine crisis, Kasuri insists that the personalities involved in the India-Pakistan back-channel talks could claim with a degree of pride and satisfaction to have achieved “better than balanced dissatisfaction” and arrived at a template that could easily be sold to various stakeholders in both countries, including, but not limited to, the peoples and legislatures. “Hundred percent (agreement) was never possible,” he says, adding on a note of caution that a minuscule “religious right” in Pakistan might not relent.

A strong votary of Congress parliamentarian Aiyar’s push for an “uninterrupted and uninterruptible” dialogue between India and Pakistan, Kasuri says it behoves of the prime ministers of both countries to renew political and diplomatic contacts when they grace the 18th SAARC summit to be hosted by Nepal on 26 November, which, incidentally, will mark the sixth anniversary of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks.

This year’s summit will be held after a three-year gap; the last summit was hosted by Maldives in 2011. While some South Asian diplomats cite this anomaly to question the efficacy of SAARC as a regional grouping, some others believe that the eight-member bloc could be meeting too frequently (annually, in the case of SAARC, where the member-states host it in the alphabetical order) for its own good.

Sheel Kant Sharma, a former Indian diplomat and a former secretary-general of SAARC, feels that the annual summits attended by the heads of state or government leave their respective bureaucracies with little or no time to act upon or follow up on the declaration adopted towards the end of a summit.

Gowher Rizvi, the international affairs adviser to Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, suspects the SAARC has been “designed not to succeed” given how underfunded it is and how more attention could be paid to strengthening its secretariat. Rizvi, who was recently in New Delhi, said at an event organised by a privately-run think-tank that the SAARC secretary-general’s post should be elevated to a ministerial rank in order to allow greater access to the political leaderships of the member-states. Shyam Saran, the chairman of the National Security Advisory Board and a former foreign secretary, in turn, feels that India should take the lead to make SAARC work.

The first SAARC summit was held in Dhaka in 1985. At the time, it had Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as its members. Since then, it has grown to include Afghanistan as a full member and many more countries and multilateral organisations as its observers.

* * * * * * *
INTERVIEW
‘Modi and Sharif must develop personal chemistry for peace to succeed’

For someone who was privy to the delicate details of the protracted India-Pakistan back-channel talks that straddled two governments in India, that of former prime ministers Manmohan Singh and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri would rather hide than reveal and understandably so. Given the sensitivities, neither country would want the painstaking effort that went into the talks to become a casualty of negative public perceptions without first preparing the ground for a grand reconciliation. However, the former Pakistani foreign minister wants the broad contours of the talks to be put on record and debated in the interest of a lasting peace on the Indian subcontinent. “I hope the current BJP government will give some thought to why Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee had concluded that talks should be the way forward,” he tells Ramesh Ramachandran in an exclusive interview.

Edited excerpts from the interview:

Your visit to India comes before a likely meeting between the leaders of India and Pakistan on the margins of the SAARC summit in Kathmandu. Also the anniversary of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks is coming up. Given that backdrop, how do you see the bilateral discourse or engagement evolving?
As somebody who has dealt with these issues for a very long time, I hope and pray that the two prime ministers meet and this despite the fact that I do not belong to Mr Nawaz Sharif’s party. I talk as a Pakistani. It is in our interest that the talks take place and I think Mr Vajpayee, the wise man of BJP, had gone through a lot of political journey before he reached the conclusion that he did. Nobody could be a better patriot than Mr Vajpayee. Nobody could doubt his wisdom. Nobody could doubt his loyalty to the BJP. So, he must have gone through a lot of experience, a lot of thought process, for him to reach the conclusion that he did. And that’s why he started the process and that’s why history will always accord that to him. We are lucky that Dr Manmohan Singh’s government followed it through. Previously, by the way, we were not certain that it would happen. So, when the BJP lost, we were very uncertain about the fate of the process that was begun by him would be. So, all I will say is that I hope the current BJP government will perhaps give some thought to why Mr Vajpayee had reached the conclusion that he did. Secondly, we have tried everything… war… near wars… nuclearisation; everything has been tried. I mean are we going to live like this? I think if you talk to a sane Indian privately, he is very angry with what Pakistan is perceived to have done. But when he is in a cooler moment, he says, after all, as Vajpayee rightly said, you can’t change your neighbours and we can’t change ours. There were people, by the way, not just in India, who said that they did not want to have anything to do with Pakistan; a lot of people in Pakistan said they did not want to have anything to do with India; that Pakistan is in the Muslim world… they were thrilled when the Americans came forward with the idea of an extended Middle East and included Pakistan in it. Now they can continue to extend the Middle East as much as they want but geography will not change. So, any Pakistani in his right mind will understand that he can be a part of the Muslim world or whatever he wants to be… he can be part of the Ummah but he can’t escape geography. And I go further as a positivist. I believe it is good for Pakistan. And I’m sure that there are a lot of good Indians who think it is good for India; that India, despite being a much bigger country than Pakistan, can achieve its potential truly when there is peace in the neighbourhood. And this is something that the Indians have said… Indian leaders are saying… I am not putting words in their mouth… they said it themselves. So, I think, keeping that in mind, let’s hope that the two prime ministers meet.

The India-Pakistan talks have a start-stop pattern to them. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s invitation to Nawaz Sharif for his swearing-in ceremony was followed by the cancellation of foreign secretary-level talks and, more recently, ceasefire violations across the Line of Control and the international border in Jammu and Kashmir. Is the atmosphere any more conducive for talks?
Let me put a counter question to those who put a question like this. When the peace process was serious, was ever a gun fired in the 2003-04 period? Not a single bullet was fired. So, I mean, the two things are linked. I agree entirely with Mani Shankar Aiyar when he talks about uninterrupted and uninterruptible dialogue… that’s, in fact, the reason why I support (a dialogue) because that is the nature of our relationship. And, of course, the famous Vietnamese bombing… the meeting in a Paris hotel between the Vietnamese negotiator and Henry Kissinger was not interrupted in spite of the bombing that was inflicted on the Vietnamese people, including phosphorous bomb, and you have seen the horrid photograph of the child burning… it is etched in my memory. So, when you talk of the state of the Pakistan-India relationship, it cannot be worse than that because no Pakistani or Indian government has in any war tried to burn people alive. I mean, to my knowledge, we have never used phosphorus. Both (India and Pakistan) have fought against each other and treated each other’s prisoners humanely. So, let’s look at the way we are different from a lot of other countries, luckily. Let’s build on it and my own feeling is that this is a temporary setback. I think Prime Minister Modi’s basic purpose is to develop India. This is what his winning slogan was and the people of India bought into it. He will have to deliver on it if he has to win the next election. In fact, in order to keep their aspirations, expectations and hopes alive, that they are not dashed, he will have to deliver and I don’t want to say anything more than what I am going to say to you. For that to be achieved to its full potential, there has to be peace in the neighbourhood. I have not seen any country develop, unless you are the United States of America, and have the capacity to literally do whatever you want to do with any other country and get away with it, but even they have paid a price. America has not got away with it. It has paid a major price for what it did to Iran and Afghanistan. Today, China has either overtaken or will overtake the American economy. Why? Because of these very distractions. So, it remains true that you need peace around if you want to develop.

There was a lot of talk about a ‘Four-Point Formula’ when Manmohan Singh and Gen Pervez Musharraf were in power. It envisioned cross-LoC movement of people, phased withdrawal of armed forces, a new model of governance and a joint mechanism for carrying the process forward. In your estimation, is that a template that governments in India and Pakistan can and must work upon?
You see, there are a lot of thoughts that I am going to say in my book. Why did we arrive at that (formula)? It’s easy to write in four lines about a four-point formula but there was a good reason: The Kashmiris didn’t wish to be divided. So, we wanted a joint mechanism where Kashmir won’t be divided. For the first time, it gave some experience to the Pakistani and the Indian leadership to interact with each other in a conducive and a productive manner, instead of trying one-upmanship in the United Nations fora. I know, I used to be thrilled when I used to be leading the Pakistani delegation because I saw young Pakistani foreign service officers work extra hard to get one paragraph brought into a NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) statement, about which I mention in my book. After keeping awake the whole night, they would tell me, ‘We have won a great victory, Sir.’ I’m sure the Indians were trying their best to ensure that the paragraph should not be included… (which talked about) a distinction between ‘terrorism’ and ‘war of independence’. What difference did it make? I used to then ask our young boys about the effort that they had made because ground reality does not change. You have to deal with India; it is your neighbour, a much bigger neighbour. What were we aiming at? A just peace. By the way, in the absence of a just peace, as I remarked to other people, even if one side wins, nothing can happen. The other won’t accept it; it will wait for a better day. That’s what happened to Germany and the result was Adolf Hitler. So, therefore, I think what we started, and I have staunchly believe and I have never changed my mind on that just as Mani Shankar Aiyar doesn’t change his mind, what’s more important for the current government is the journey — intellectual and mental journey — that Mr Vajpayee went through.

Like it or not, a lot more depends on personalities than systems or processes in the Indian subcontinent. Do you think personal chemistry matters, too? How important is it or will be for a dialogue among political leaders such as a Modi in India and a Sharif in Pakistan? Is there a critical mass on both sides to take the peace process forward?
You will be surprised that I devote an ­entire chapter in my book to personal relationships and Mani also figures in it. I strongly believe in it. It matters but is it a Berlin Wall that you cannot overcome? Not at all. My way of dealing with the Indians was first to accept that they are as human as I am. Their instincts are the same as mine. I was able to ­convince them… at least three foreign ministers of India I dealt with… that they could take me at my word, that I would do my best. I was not a dictator of Pakistan, but they knew if I made a commitment I will try my best. Human relationships matter, but it doesn’t mean human relationships are always among people of similar backgrounds. People who are entrusted vast responsibilities by their nations are ­under extraordinary compulsions to ­actually break the Berlin Wall and try and develop that empathy, because in the absence of that empathy I agree with you it’s very difficult to do any constructive work. If perpetually you are thinking the other ­fellow is out to do you in, then it won’t work. So I think Prime Ministers Modi and Sharif or whoever comes to power in Pakistan, they must develop that chemistry. But that is not going to happen overnight. Sometimes you (know some people)… Mani Shankar Aiyar and I knew each other but it doesn’t mean that I knew every interlocutor of mine. I didn’t know Natwar Singh or Pranab Mukherjee but I developed very good chemistry with them. They knew they wanted to serve India’s cause, I wanted to serve Pakistan’s cause. We have to first convince that our cause was not so completely in conflict. What was the common factor? The 600 million people living below the poverty line while the Chinese have lifted 600 million above the poverty line. The ­Chinese were behind Pakistan and India in 1949; this is something that we should try and emulate.

If I were to now talk about the domestic politics in Pakistan, we see your party and its leader Imran Khan agitating and mobilising public opinion against the Sharif government. Where do you think the domestic political discourse in Pakistan lies vis-à-vis India?
Here’s the good news. Nobody can contradict me. And I put it in my book. I have quoted him (Imran Khan), so when he comes to power, all those speeches of him will be quoted back to him. I have said in the book the areas where I disagree with Imran Khan but the area where I entirely agree with him is on India. And there are many statements that I have quoted and hopefully Imran means what he says and I have no doubt that he means what he says. I have seen a lot of goodwill for him in India, by the way. Although some people may not agree with his current politics, they have goodwill for him as a person. So, my own feeling is that Imran wants peace with India. He wants a just peace, as I do. And then I did something clever. I actually briefed him before he was going to Mirpur to deliver a speech. He went on record that I have briefed him and he supports that. I’m interested in making sure that it comes in my book. So, that means that the next government after Nawaz Sharif’s will be our government.

So, am I correct in presuming that you remain an incorrigible optimist about the India-Pakistan peace process?
As I said, I have no option; the other is a disaster I am not prepared to confront. And for the Pakistan-India relationship with the history that it has, you have to be an optimist. But it’s not that I am a foolish optimist. I am an optimist based on what I saw at close hand. I could see people regarded as hawks like Brajesh Mishra (the late national security adviser) meeting me in Munich; we interacted as human beings. We have had hawks on the Pakistani side. Hawk or whatever, everybody is human on the inside. The point is to touch the right chord and everybody should know, Indians and Pakistanis, that beyond a certain point the other side cannot be pushed. If you realise that, no mountain is insurmountable.

So, the moment that came some few years ago is not entirely lost. Peace is eminently possible and doable?
Whenever there are statesmen in power, hopefully soon; if unfortunately not soon, whenever; they will have a blueprint before them. They will know this is the bottom line for both the governments. Beyond that neither government will relent. So, the good thing is that the work that has been done is on record. There’s no poker anymore. You can’t pretend to ask for the moon because the other side already knows what you have agreed and this is institutional memory by the way. Regardless of posturing, it remains in institutional memory. I can’t believe that Dr Manmohan Singh was not consulting the Indian Army and somebody in the (Indian) foreign office must have been in his confidence.

In hindsight, do you think Manmohan Singh erred in not seizing the moment and travelling to Pakistan in 2006?
It was just bad luck. You had elections in Uttar Pradesh and some other states. I wish he had come (to Pakistan)… hindsight, they say, is 20/20. If I think Dr Manmohan knew what was going to happen in March 2007, he would have strained extra hard despite the elections. So, I give him benefit of the doubt. I didn’t know what was going to happen in March (the protests by lawyers after Musharraf suspended the chief justice of Pakistan’s supreme court), so why should Manmohan Singh have known? I thought we were there for the next five years. That’s the next thing I have learnt in politics. Never make that mistake. When for the first time my name was mentioned as foreign minister, I accompanied Asghar Khan to Tehran and they thought he would be the prime minister and I would be foreign minister… this was several decades ago. And we were with the Shah of Iran and I say in the book how he was holding forth on Mozambique to Angola but didn’t know a thing that was happening in Tehran. And five months after we met, he was out. And he was at the height of his power. With all the American might behind him, the Americans didn’t provide him (Shah of Iran) with land for a grave. He had to go to Egypt to be buried. So, things change dramatically.

THAROOR, INTERRUPTED

This article was first published by Tehelka (www.tehelka.com) on 16 October 2014 under the headline Tharoor, Interrupted


Shashi Tharoor, like Manmohan Singh before him, knows only too well the fate that would befall Congress loyalists if they even as much as, by your leave, demur. Manmohan learnt it the hard way when the Gandhi scion and Congress vice-president Rahul Gandhi famously remarked, “My personal opinion about the ordinance on convicted lawmakers is that it is complete nonsense, it should be torn and thrown away,” leaving the then prime minister red-faced.

Manmohan understood the Congress dynamic (in his book The Accidental Prime Minister, Sanjaya Baru quotes him as saying that “I have to accept that the party president is the centre of power”) but what has confounded some in the party is how Tharoor could end up committing the same mistake twice, that of taking on the sacred cows dear to the Congress president, Sonia Gandhi, and her team of hand-picked advisers.

This when Tharoor himself is no stranger to party politics, having got his fingers burnt a few years ago, when he mixed up his idioms to explain flying economy (“in cattle class out of solidarity with all our holy cows!” he had tweeted.) In Tharoor’s defence, he had clarified that by the words “holy cows” he was not referring to any individuals. “Holy cows (sic) are not individuals but sacrosanct issues or principles that no one dares challenge. Wish critics would look it up,” he had said, explaining himself.

If Tharoor’s savvy for Twitter made him controversial then, it has come to haunt him again. His tryst with the latest controversy has as much to do with his celebrity status on Twitter as with his unconventional approach to politics. On 2 October, the birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi, Prime Minister Narendra Modi threw Tharoor a curve by inviting him and eight others — Goa Governor Mridula Sinha, former cricketer Sachin Tendulkar, yoga guru Baba Ramdev, industrialist Anil Ambani, actors Kamal Haasan, Salman Khan, Priyanka Chopra and the cast of Hindi TV comedy serial Tarak Mehta Ka Ulta Chashma — to join him in the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Campaign).

Modi was inspired by the ALS Ice Bucket Challenge, which went viral on social media in August, to promote awareness of the Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) disease. (The activity involved pouring a bucket of ice-cold water on one’s head and inviting others to do the same.) The idea, as Modi was to explain, was that “they (the nine nominated by Modi) will nominate nine people each, and this chain will continue through social media. When you upload a video of cleaning, nominate nine others to do the same.”

Tharoor, who was on his way to Romania when the prime minister made the announcement, reacted upon landing there but by then politics had taken over. To be fair to him, he would have been damned if he did and damned if he did not accept the prime minister’s invitation. Tharoor’s explanation as to why he accepted the invitation was lost on some of his colleagues.

In a signed article Tharoor wrote for the NDTV website a few days later, he said: “Which Indian worthy of the name would not be humbled to be tapped by his prime minister for a national cause? … (His) invitation to nine people who are not part of his government helped portray it as a people’s movement rather than a government drive. Who would be churlish enough to refuse an offer to participate in a people’s movement, inspired by Mahatma Gandhi, that would improve the lives of all Indians?”

Probably sensing a barrage of criticism that could come his way, Tharoor qualified it by saying: “At the same time, as I also said in accepting his invitation, I am not a fan of tokenism, and I was worried the campaign would descend to symbolic photo opportunities for grandees who would never touch a broom again after 2 October.”

On 8 October, the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee (KPCC) met in Thiruvananthapuram to discuss the fallout of Tharoor’s alleged misdemeanours. “Tharoor has hurt the sentiments of the party workers and it should have been avoided. The KPCC will submit a report to the AICC (All India Congress Committee) leadership, which will talk in detail of the sentiments of party workers in the state on this issue. This should not be repeated again,” KPCC president VM Sudheeran told reporters after the meeting.

As Tharoor is an AICC member, the KPCC could only recommend the party leadership to take appropriate action against him. By 13 October, the Congress had issued a terse press statement announcing Tharoor’s sacking from the post of a spokesperson of the party. “Congress president Sonia Gandhi has accepted the recommendation of the AICC disciplinary committee to remove Shashi Tharoor from the list of spokespersons of the AICC with immediate effect,” it read.

Congress general secretary Janardhan Dwivedi said that the AICC disciplinary action committee took the decision based on a “complaint” submitted to it by the KPCC. The three-member committee comprised Motilal Vora, AK Antony and Sushil Kumar Shinde.

According to Congress sources, the KPCC felt that Tharoor’s conciliatory statements about Modi would do more harm than good to the party in Kerala. Sudheeran promptly welcomed the action against Tharoor, saying it was an “appropriate decision”.

For his part, Tharoor sought to draw a line under the episode by saying that “as a loyal worker of the Congress party, (I) accept the decision of the party president to relieve me of my responsibilities as a spokesman” though with a caveat that: “While I have not yet seen the KPCC complaint referred to, and while I would have welcomed an opportunity to respond to it and draw the attention of the AICC leadership to the full range of my statements and writings on contemporary political issues, I am now treating this matter as closed and have no further comment to make.”


Factional feud

The controversy surrounding the death of Tharoor’s wife Sunanda Pushkar added grist to the political rumour mills. A postmortem report did not rule out “poisoning” as the cause of her death. Sunanda was found dead in mysterious circumstances in a hotel room in New Delhi on 17 January. (The party has since iterated that the decision to sack Tharoor as a spokesperson should not be linked to the controversy surrounding the post-mortem examination of his wife.)

However, the report came in handy for Tharoor’s detractors in the party, particularly those hailing from Kerala, who see him as an outsider and resent his growing profile in the party and outside.

Some former ministers in the UPA government such as Mullapally Ramachandran and Vayalar Ravi have been more than forthcoming in sharing the contents of the report with the media in the state and in the national capital in a bid to fix Tharoor. They see Tharoor, a suave and sophisticated politician with a big fan following on social media, as a threat to their preeminence.

Needless to say, there is no love lost between them. Tharoor’s retort that his Kerala colleagues should at least read his articles and comments before preparing their report for the AICC did not help matters either.

Compounding matters for Tharoor, Kerala Chief Minister Oommen Chandy further distanced himself from an already isolated Tharoor by saying that a “series” of issues involving the MP had hurt the sentiments of the party leaders in the state.

Among the many other indiscretions that were cited against Tharoor were:

• Tharoor’s article published by The Huffington Post, a US-based online news site, in June in which he said, “For an Opposition Member of Parliament like myself, it would be churlish not to acknowledge Modi 2.0’s inclusive outreach and to welcome his more conciliatory statements and actions. The moment he says or does something divisive or sectarian in the Modi 1.0 mould, however, we will resist him robustly. India’s people, and its pluralist democracy, deserve no less.” The party immediately dismissed it as his personal view. That it had not gone down well with a section of the party can be had from the fact that Tharoor has not been asked to address the media as a spokesperson since then; and

• Tharoor holding forth on the prime minister’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly in New York to an Indian television channel which had invited him to a panel discussion. According to some in the Congress, Tharoor had not been authorised to do so. Tharoor had variously described the prime minister’s speech as “impressive”, “well done” and “all together an ‘A’ ”. He felt that the speech was “spot on”, although he did find fault with certain portions of the prime minister’s remarks.

Mullapally Ramachandran and (right) Vayalar Ravi

A pre-emptive strike

Tharoor’s sacking should be seen as a preemptive strike by the Congress to make an example of him and send out a message to the party rank and file that it will not brook any indiscretion, however innocent it might seem, in the interest of the party. However, on balance, the punishment meted out to him seems disproportionate to his alleged crime.

To some observers, the sacking of Tharoor is more a symptom of a deeper malaise afflicting the Congress party than anything else. The irony is that a Congress loyalist (a fifth column?) such as Mani Shankar Aiyar is treated with kid gloves even when his uninterrupted and uninterruptible diatribe against Modi cost the party dear in the General Election. His chaiwala remark, in particular, did nothing to project the Congress as a party worthy of a popular mandate to govern.

Also, the party didn’t pull up a Milind Deora when he took aim at Rahul and some of his advisers for the party’s defeat in the Lok Sabha polls.

Most recently, Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi praised Prime Minister Modi’s ambitious Sansad Adarsh Gram Yojana (SAGY) or Member of Parliament Model Village Scheme and also had participated in the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan in Guwahati. (Under the SAGY, MPs from both Houses of Parliament would be asked to develop one village from their constituency by 2016 and another two by 2019.)

However, Gogoi soon made amends by explaining his position. The fear of a reprimand from the party leadership was evident in the manner in which he clarified that he was not following in the footsteps of Modi by launching a Clean Assam Campaign and that his inspiration even as a child was Mahatma Gandhi.

Tharoor’s sacking raises more questions than answers, especially when the Congress has more pressing issues at hand. To begin with, it needs to reinvent itself by reorganising the party apparatuses and revisiting its strategy of how to take on the BJP and Modi; revive its political fortunes in the states; and also pave the way for a more robust intervention by Rahul in the party’s affairs.

Then there is a larger question of why Indian politicos don’t seem to have a sense of humour?

The irony is that some in the Congress seem to be taking themselves more seriously than perhaps the electorate, which did not see it fit to bestow on the party the status of the principal Opposition party in the Lok Sabha, by limiting its strength to a mere 44 MPs in the lower House of Parliament.


Speaking at a function to celebrate his The Great Indian Novel in New Delhi some years ago, Tharoor had said that when he wrote the book, he was not sure whether there could be humour in politics. It doesn’t seem so yet.

An Early Warning

This article was first published by Tehelka (www.tehelka.com) on 18 September 2014 under the headline "An Early Warning"

Rude awakening: Narendra Modi and Amit Shah have their task cut out for them and there is neither room for complacency nor scope for hubris
What do the bypoll results mean for the BJP and Narendra Modi? Ramesh Ramachandran and Virendra Nath Bhatt try to find some answers

It may be too early to conclude that the results of the recently concluded bypolls in nine states, particularly Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan and to a lesser extent Gujarat, are a referendum of sorts on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 100-odd-day-old government or, conversely, signal a Congress recovery after its humiliating loss in the recent General Election.

At best, they could and probably should be seen as an early warning for the BJP and its affiliates whose impulse has been to pick the low-hanging fruit in the form of, say, appealing to the baser instincts of man a la ‘love jihad’ than to making a concerted effort to build on attempts by BJP patriarchs Atal Bihari Vajpayee and LK Advani to make the BJP the natural party of governance.

Bypolls have now been held in 54 Assembly constituencies across 14 states (Uttarakhand in July; Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Karnataka in August; and Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Assam, West Bengal, Tripura and Sikkim in September) since the BJP-led NDA government came to power on 26 May. The BJP and its alliance partners had held 36 of those Assembly seats but they have managed to retain only 20 of them.

Whither Modi wave?

The BJP rode on Modi’s popularity to an unprecedented win in the General Election when it won 71 out of 80 seats in Uttar Pradesh, all 25 seats in Rajasthan and all 26 seats in Gujarat. Amit Shah, who has since taken over as BJP chief, was largely seen as the architect of the party’s strategy in Uttar Pradesh. Cut to September and the party suffers a setback in varying degrees in each of those states, which is why the contrast is that much starker.

In Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Gujarat, which together account for 24 Assembly seats where bypolls were held, the BJP retained only 10 seats (it had 23 seats going in to the bypolls) while its ally, Apna Dal, lost the Rohaniya seat — which falls in the Varanasi parliamentary constituency held by Modi — to the Samajwadi Party (SP).

Apna Dal national president Krishna Patel only managed to garner 61,672 votes, whereas in the Lok Sabha election, Modi had polled 1.19 lakh votes from this Assembly segment alone. (Krishna Patel’s daughter Anupriya was the sitting MLA from Rohaniya when she was elected as the MP from Mirzapur.)

In Rajasthan, the Congress wrested the Nasirabad, Weir and Surajgarh seats from BJP, leaving the latter with only one win in Kota. Similarly, in Gujarat, the Congress won three seats and the BJP six.

The only consolation for the BJP was that it made its debut in the West Bengal Assembly by winning the Basirhat Dakshin seat.

Predictably, BJP spokespersons maintain that the bypolls results are not a reflection on Narendra Modi’s government or governance. They are quick to point out that bypolls in Assembly constituencies, as opposed to Lok Sabha seats, are generally fought on local issues and therefore too much should not be read into the results.

The Congress, on the other hand, claims that the verdict is a clear indication that voters have rejected the divisive politics practised by the BJP. Although some Congress office-bearers went overboard in their assessments of the party’s performance in the Rajasthan and Gujarat bypolls, the only sobering voice was that of Shakeel Ahmad, a general secretary and a spokesman of the party, who sought to suggest that although the verdict is more against the BJP than for a particular party, it would be incorrect to write it off or to say that the BJP has been rendered inconsequential. What Ahmad leaves unsaid is that the Congress was in a similar situation 10 years ago when it performed badly in the bypolls that were held immediately after the UPA came to power in 2004.

History bears it out, too. The party that wins a Lok Sabha election tends to perform below par in the Assembly bypolls immediately afterwards, especially if the Centre and the state(s) concerned are ruled by different parties or coalitions. That may, therefore, explain the BJP’s less-than-impressive performance in Rajasthan and Gujarat, where it is in power, and also its particularly disappointing tally in Uttar Pradesh, which is ruled by the SP. It is not to say that there are no other factors, or a combination thereof, that could be at play here: complacency, a lack of motivation, local issues holding sway over regional or pan-national concerns or even the choice of candidates are also known to have affected the outcome of a bypoll.

For the BJP in particular, Modi’s absence would have affected its political fortunes in the recent bypolls, too, which sends out another equally worrisome message to the party rank and file: that Modi is still the BJP’s (only?) best bet; that the BJP’s organisation and leadership in certain states are not as strong as it would like them to be; and that going forward, the services of Modi and a battery of other leaders would be required if the party wants to come good in the Assembly elections in Maharashtra, Haryana, Jharkhand and Jammu and Kashmir this year, Bihar in 2015 and Uttar Pradesh in 2017, among others. (In the bypolls held in Bihar in August, the alliance between and among Janata Dal (United), Rashtriya Janata Dal and the Congress won six out of 10 seats.)

BJP campaign backfires in UP

So what went wrong for the BJP in Uttar Pradesh? At the outset, the BJP’s campaign in the run-up to the bypolls in the state saw the party employ some of the same rhetoric or tactics that one saw in the Lok Sabha election. That gambit may have worked for it then but not this time; on the contrary, it benefited the SP as the minorities voted en bloc for it even as the Dalits remained indifferent towards the BJP.

For a party that was voted to power at the Centre on a hugely popular poll plank of development, the BJP chose to whip up communal passions. For instance, Sakshi Maharaj, the sitting BJP MP from Unnao, described madrasas as a breeding ground of terrorists while Yogi Adityanath, the BJP MP from Gorakhpur, was accused of making inflammatory statements. Union minister Maneka Gandhi, in turn, claimed that money from meat trade was being used to fund terror activities. The BJP had also staged a month-long drama at Kaanth town in Moradabad after the district administration removed a loudspeaker from a temple frequented by the Dalits living in a predominantly Muslim village during Ramzan in the month of July.

Looking back, the law of diminishing returns appears to have put paid to the shrill campaign orchestrated by the likes of Yogi Adityanath and Sakshi Maharaj as it clearly failed to enthuse even the BJP's own supporters. Drafting Adityanath as a star campaigner proved to be another fatal flaw as the SP conveniently exploited it to its advantage. Fearing communal polarisation, the SP and the Congress fielded few Muslim candidates; the Congress fielded two Muslims and SP one. As it turns out, the SP’s lone Muslim candidate won from Thakurdwara, defeating the BJP candidate by more than 27,000 votes.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the BJP singularly failed to capitalise on the strong anti-incumbency against the Akhilesh Yadav government, whose tenure has been marked by an unprecedented power crisis; a record number of incidents of communal tension and riots, including, but not limited to, Muzaffarnagar; and a steep rise in crimes against women.

Pramod Kumar, a professor at Lucknow University, says that the BJP probably misattributed its performance in the Lok Sabha elections in the state to communal polarisation when it was actually the development plank, strongly marketed by Modi in his inimitable style of communication, which influenced the voters.

On balance, if a political obituary for Modi and the BJP is premature, so are the assertions by a section of the political parties ranged against the NDA, particularly the SP, that the results of the bypolls indicate a strong voter preference for their respective leaderships or programmes. The SP wrested seven out of the 10 seats held by BJP (and one seat held by Apna Dal). It won the Charkhari Assembly seat, in Bundelkhand region, vacated by Union minister Uma Bharti, with a comfortable margin of more than 50,000 votes; the Congress came second and the BJP third. Incidentally, the bypolls were necessitated in the state because the BJP MLAs from all 11 seats have since been elected to Parliament.

Akhilesh Yadav, who completed 30 months in office on 15 September, says that the voters have reposed their faith in the SP in spite of the criticism heaped on the party and the government by its political rivals and media alike.

“Communal forces should draw a clear lesson from the poll verdict… the voters have rejected them and endorsed the development agenda of the Samajwadi Party government,” says Yadav.

A senior SP leader, in turn, says, “It is the end of the so-called Modi magic or wave… For the BJP, the party is over.”

However, AK Verma, who teaches political science at Christ Church College in Kanpur, counters by saying that the results of the bypolls to 11 seats can neither be interpreted as an indictment of the Modi government nor an endorsement of the Akhilesh Yadav government.

An analysis of the SP’s performance would also not be complete without first understanding the consequences of the BSP’s decision to keep away from the bypolls. In the March 2012 Assembly election, the BSP had finished second in six out of the 11 Assembly constituencies where the bypolls were held. This time, the SP managed to get some Dalit votes, particularly in the Bundelkhand region (Hamirpur and Charkhari seats) and eastern Uttar Pradesh (Sirathu seat in Kaushambi and Balha in Bahraich).

In Bundelkhand, the victory margins of the SP candidates — with more than 66,000 votes — gives a clear indication that this would not be possible without a chunk of the Dalit votes voting for the SP. Also, the Congress did not have winnable candidates in the bypolls. That meant that the BJP was in a direct contest with the SP as compared to the four-cornered contest in the parliamentary election. Therefore, the victory of the SP, whose record of governance has been uninspiring from the word go, needs to be seen in its proper context.

Verma explains that the SP’s vote share fell by only 1 percent, from 22 percent in the 2009 parliamentary election to 21 percent in the 2014 parliamentary election, but its tally of seats plummeted from 21 seats in 2009 to a mere five seats in 2014.

“The SP was wiped out by a Modi wave as it was Modi versus the rest,” says Verma. “Also, the people of Uttar Pradesh had overwhelmingly voted for Modi’s development plank and not as much for the BJP. However, Modi was missing in the bypolls and the BJP did not enthuse the voters that much. Moreover, the BSP was not in the race and the Congress’ candidates were too weak to pose any challenge to anyone. Therefore, it became a straight contest between the SP and BJP. The voters were left with not many options, so they voted for SP; it not only won by default but it almost got a walkover in eight of the 11 seats.”

The road ahead

The message from the results of the bypolls is clear: the BJP and Modi (not necessarily in that order) were elected to power by the development- and good governance-starved voter who hopes to have more of the two over the next five years. Veer away from the straight and narrow and the Modi-Shah duopoly runs the risk of committing the same mistakes first made by Manmohan Singh and the Congress and then by Arvind Kejriwal and the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP).

If the slew of scams in UPA-2 came as a disappointment to a section of the middle classes that swore by Manmohan’s Teflon image, those who voted Kejriwal and AAP to power in Delhi in the hope of getting for themselves an efficient administration felt let down when he quit within 49 days.


Modi and BJP have their task cut out for them and there is neither room for complacency nor scope for hubris. As one who excels in micromanagement and pays attention to detail, Modi knows only too well that he cannot take the voter for granted or insult their intelligence. Belie their hopes and expectations and the unforgiving voter will strike back.

Shades of grey in India-Sri Lanka ties: Time for reshaping India's neighbourhood policy

This article was published by www.rediff.com on 28 March 2014 under the headline "Time for reshaping India's neighbourhood policyand by www.atimes.com on 31 March 2014 under the headline "UN vote shows strains in Delhi's diplomacy":

President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India

Abstaining from voting on a UNHRC resolution on Sri Lanka was dictated as much by necessity and self-preservation as by a desire to place bilateralism at the front and centre of New Delhi’s ties with Colombo, says Ramesh Ramachandran.

In a departure from its hitherto familiar voting pattern on United Nations Human Rights Council resolutions critical of Sri Lanka, India on Thursday abstained from casting its vote on the resolution that approved an independent international investigation into certain alleged war crimes and gross human rights violations committed by the government of Sri Lanka during the 2009 civil war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
The customary ‘explanation of vote’ by the permanent representative of India to the UN offices in Geneva said, among other things, that: 
* “In asking the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate, assess and monitor the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, the resolution ignores the progress already made by the country in this field and places in jeopardy the cooperation currently taking place between the government of Sri Lanka and the OHCHR and the council’s special procedures. Besides, the resolution is inconsistent and impractical in asking both the government of Sri Lanka and the OHCHR to simultaneously conduct investigations”;
* “India believes that it is imperative for every country to have the means of addressing human rights violations through robust national mechanisms. The council’s efforts should therefore be in a direction to enable Sri Lanka to investigate all allegations of human rights violations through comprehensive, independent and credible national investigative mechanisms and bring to justice those found guilty. Sri Lanka should be provided all assistance it desires in a cooperative and collaborative manner”; and
* “It has been India’s firm belief that adopting an intrusive approach that undermines national sovereignty and institutions is counterproductive.”
After having voted for the UNHRC resolutions on Sri Lanka in 2012 and 2013, India’s abstention this year is indicative of a course correction in New Delhi’s engagement with Colombo that is aimed at retrieving the ground lost in the intervening years, burnishing India’s credentials as a relevant player in the island nation’s affairs and signalling a return to bilateralism as the centrepiece of India-Sri Lanka ties (not necessarily in that order).
If India’s support for the resolutions in the previous years exposed an utter bankruptcy of ideas on how to engage with Sri Lanka (thereby implicitly admitting to a failure on the part of New Delhi to either influence the course of events or bring about the desired change in Colombo’s disposition), the abstention should be seen as a belated attempt to pull the relationship back from the brink.
Of course, it helped that the reaction from the regional parties was muted this year and that gave New Delhi extra room for manoeuvre, enabling it in the process to regain its voice vis-a-vis the states on foreign policy matters.
It needs to be said here that India cannot claim to adhere to a consistent policy towards Sri Lanka. First it nurtured the LTTE and burnt its fingers in the process. Then it extended a tacit support to Colombo -- before, during and after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in May 2009 -- only to later, in its wisdom, support the UNHRC resolution piloted by the United States. The 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting summit in Sri Lanka was as much in the news for the renewed focus on the human rights record of the host nation as for the decision by the prime minister of India not to take part in it. In his stead it was left to External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid to lead the Indian delegation for the biennial event of the 53-nation Commonwealth.
In a letter of regret that was hand-delivered to President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Singh informed Rajapaksa of his inability to attend personally but he did not assign any reasons for it. Suffice it to say that a careful reading of the history of India-Sri Lanka relations would make it evident to just about anyone that India’s policy towards this island-nation in the Indian Ocean can be described as consistently inconsistent, characterised by myopia and self-inflicted crises.
For the ministry of external affairs, what should be particularly worrying is the erosion in India’s standing, in what it calls, its sphere of influence. The recent debate over which way India should vote on a UNHRC resolution on Sri Lanka is instructive to the extent that it illustrated how far India has come from being an influential actor in its neighbourhood to being a marginal or fringe player.
Put simply (not simplistically), some of the key questions were: Is it advisable for New Delhi to vote for the resolutions and risk losing whatever goodwill and leverage it might have had with Colombo? Should not all other options have been exhausted before India (figuratively) threw in the towel and (literally) threw in its lot with the West? Thursday’s abstention has partially answered that question. However, there remains another worry:
The protestations from Tamil Nadu chief minister J Jayalalithaa and her rival and DMK patriarch M Karunanidhi over India’s vote on Sri Lanka in 2012, coming as they did a few months after West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee ‘vetoed’ an agreement on the sharing of the Teesta river waters with Bangladesh, injected a certain degree of dissonance in the conduct of foreign policy. What fuelled the diplomats’ anxiety was the precedent that would be set if the Centre caved in or succumbed to the states on matters that fell in the Union Government’s realm. Already, India’s engagement of Pakistan on one hand and China and Burma on the other are determined to an extent by the domestic conditions prevalent in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states, respectively. 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh betrayed his frustration when he said in the Lok Sabha that difficult decisions were getting more difficult because of coalition compulsions. He called for bipartisanship in the interest of the country. At the same time, what cannot be denied is that there exists a view among a section of serving and former practitioners of diplomacy that devolution of foreign policy to more stakeholders than what is currently assumed should not be entirely unwelcome.
As a former foreign secretary told this writer, “Foreign policy today is made not only in New Delhi but elsewhere, too. There are multiple stakeholders and one can’t deny states a say in foreign policy if it relates to them.” In other words, it is argued that if the states assert their rights and/or seek more consultations, then the Centre must respect those sentiments.
Having said that, an impression seems to be gaining ground, erroneously at that, that foreign policy is the worst sufferer of this nouveau phenomenon of the states having their say in matters pertaining to foreign policy. A cursory look at recent years would show that the states have consistently been vocal on a host of other issues, too. The recent examples of certain states or regional parties opposing the policy of raising the cap on FDI (foreign direct investment) in single-brand retail is a case in point. As is the opposition to the Centre’s proposal for setting up a National Counter Terrorism Centre.
In some of these cases New Delhi chose to yield, albeit temporarily, but in some others it had its way. Therefore, it would not be accurate to suggest that regional influences are wielding a ‘veto’ over New Delhi. Also, it would not be fair to either paint the states as villains of the piece or to apportion all the blame for the Centre’s foreign policy woes to regional parties that are, or could be, aligned against it in the political arena.
For instance, the Centre accuses the West Bengal government headed by the Trinamool Congress party of scuttling a river waters sharing agreement with Bangladesh. However, the Congress, which heads the ruling coalition at the Centre and also in Kerala, is guilty of playing to narrow political sentiments, too, as was evidenced by the state government’s and the party’s stand on the two Italian marines who are facing murder charges for the deaths of two Indian fishermen off the Kerala coast.
On balance, it is time for reshaping India’s neighbourhood policy in a manner that it reflects the broadest possible national consensus on the way forward in reshaping ties with countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. A reset is imperative, irrespective of which coalition forms the next government in New Delhi. India can ill-afford a Pavlovian foreign policy.
Equally, framing India’s foreign policy options as a binary choice can be self-defeating. There needs to be a dispassionate debate and a greater appreciation of various shades of grey (pun unintended.)

REMOVE THE BLINKERS

This article was published by Asia Times Online (www.atimes.com) on 17 October 2013 under the headline: "Singh takes a lonely road on Pakistan". Here is the link to it.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in a bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif in
New York on 29 September 2013 (Pictures courtesy: www.pmindia.nic.in)

New Delhi
16 October 2013

The Prime Minister of India met with his Pakistan counterpart on the margins of the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 29 September 2013, defying public sentiment and in spite of an overwhelming body of evidence of Pakistan’s complicity in allowing its territory to be used for mounting terrorist attacks against India and Indian interests, at home and abroad alike. The discourse leading up to the meeting was dominated by whether the talks should at all be held in the immediate backdrop of the 26 September 2013 twin terror attacks in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in which Indian soldiers, police personnel and civilians were killed. It was not an isolated incident: In January this year an Indian soldier was beheaded at the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan; in August five more Indian soldiers were killed; and, in between, several more such killings and infiltrations were reported. As it became known later, the Indian Army was engaged in an operation to repulse an attempt from the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) to push a tranche of infiltrators across the Line of Control even as the two premiers shook hands and posed for the cameras. It took the army a fortnight to successfully conclude the anti-infiltration operation. If the government dithered on calling Pakistan’s bluff, the army chief made it eminently clear to anyone who would care to listen that it is impossible for terrorists to carry out any activity along the LoC without the knowledge of the Pakistani Army.

By the Indian government’s own admission, the expectations from the New York talks had to be toned down given the terror arm which is still active in the Indian subcontinent. And as it predictably turned out, there was not much to show by way of outcomes except for the two sides deciding to task their respective Directors-General of Military Operations (DGMOs) to meet for suggesting effective means to restore the ceasefire. Even that looks remote now. The two DGMOs last met in 1999 although they speak fairly regularly. The New York meeting could at best be described as a photo-op. If anything, it once again reaffirmed Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s, and by extension his government’s, adamantly consistent but questionable position on talks with Pakistan. After the 26 November 2008 Mumbai attacks, too, he had similarly disregarded public opinion to first meet with the then President of Pakistan at Yekaterinburg in Russia on the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, and later with the then Prime Minister of Pakistan at the Red Sea resort of Sharm-el-Sheikh in Egypt on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit. It was at Sharm-el-Sheikh that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his team agreed to a joint statement with Pakistan that said: “Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue Process and these should not be bracketed”. Also, in another first, Balochistan was allowed to creep into the text of an India - Pakistan joint statement. Pakistan has since conveniently used the bogey of Indian involvement in stirring up trouble in Balochistan as a stock response to India’s assertions of a Pakistani hand in fomenting unrest in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

All of which begs the question: Talks to what end, and at what cost? Is the life of an Indian – be it a soldier or a civilian — so cheap that talks with Pakistan should continue at any cost and in spite of a spate of terrorist attacks, as evidenced most recently in the twin terror attacks in the Samba and Kathua sectors of Jammu and Kashmir? How many more brave Indian soldiers should be killed in cowardly terrorist attacks before the decision-making apparatuses of the government proactively seek out the military’s views? How many more families should lose their loved ones at the hands of the terrorists and their masters outside our borders before the government of the day begins to pay heed to the sentiments of the common man whom it claims to represent? Why are no visible attempts being made to restore the delicate civil-military balance and to uphold the dignity and morale of the soldier? Instead, what we are witnessing today is a government that is playing with fire and it needs to stop now. External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid has since clarified that while the two Prime Ministers met in New York the stage has not been reached where the two sides have indicated any dates, timeline or perspective on resuming the dialogue. And with a post-2014 Afghanistan looming large on the horizon it is anyone’s guess as to how much time and effort Pakistan, given its proclivities, will be willing to spare and/or invest in preserving the incremental peace dividends and insulating the bilateral relationship from external influences.


Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in a bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister of
Pakistan Nawaz Sharif in New York on 29 September 2013. Also seen in the picture
(on the right) are External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, National Security
Adviser Shivshankar Menon and Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh
What the discerning stakeholders in India today need be understand is that this government’s blind faith in dialogue with Pakistan has not disproved those who have little or no faith in talks under the present circumstances. The history of India – Pakistan bilateral engagement over the past decade and more is replete with an unending series of terrorist attacks interspersed with peace talks, an overwhelming majority of which were held in third countries on the margins of multilateral summits. The New York meeting is but one in a long list of bilateral engagements starting with the 2006 NAM summit at Havana in Cuba, the 2008 Asia –Europe Meeting (ASEM) at Beijing in China, the 2008 United Nations General Assembly session in New York, the 2009 SCO summit at Yekaterinburg in Russia, the 2009 NAM summit at Sharm-el-Sheikh and the 2010 SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) summit at Thimphu in Bhutan. Add to it former Pakistan President Gen Pervez Musharraf’s visit to New Delhi in 2005 and former Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s visit to Mohali in 2011 for watching cricket or the private visits by Pakistani heads of state/government to Ajmer and you have a veritably uninterrupted dialogue that can be traced further back to Lahore, 1999; Agra, 2001; and Islamabad, 2004. Importantly, these bilateral engagements have survived multiple terrorist attacks and conflicts dating back to Kargil and Kandahar in 1999, Parliament in 2001, Mumbai train bombings of 2006 and the 26/11 terrorist attacks again in Mumbai, in 2008. But what has come of the talks so far? Are we any closer to a breakthrough than we were before? Have terrorist attacks diminished appreciably? Unfortunately, after every terrorist attack the government of the day mouths platitudes and employs boilerplate language such as ‘It cannot be business as usual’ or ‘Patience is not inexhaustible’ only to go back on them at the first available opportunity! This government has tied itself in knots over its Pakistan policy but it has only itself to blame for it. Its inability to think out of the box has exposed its bankruptcy of ideas on how to deal with an increasingly intransigent neighbour. And Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s personal quest for a lasting legacy insofar as Pakistan is concerned has only further compounded an already intractable conundrum.

The government needs to remove its blinkers and begin to appreciate that terrorism and talks cannot go hand in hand. It is imperative that the government shows zero tolerance to terrorism, takes strong steps to prevent terror attacks and imposes costs on the perpetrators of terrorism. Most importantly, the government must heed public opinion. The time has come for the government to start calling Pakistan’s bluff, to act firmly and decisively and if that involves putting a moratorium on future talks with Pakistan at the highest level, “so be it.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has used this specific language before, albeit to a domestic audience in the run up to the India – United States nuclear cooperation agreement in his first term in office when the Left parties parted ways with the UPA; there is no reason why in the instant context Pakistan cannot be told “So be it”; that India will be free to pursue its course of action if Pakistan does not intend to reciprocate peace overtures; and that consequences will follow if it does not give satisfaction to India on what India considers to be its core interests. Saying no to talks now is not the same as saying no to talks ever and it certainly need not necessarily mean or come to represent an escalation of tensions. A range of other equally effective options is available to the government of the day to execute its Pakistan policy and these must be explored. Above all, the government must forge the broadest possible national consensus on the way forward for a détente with Pakistan.