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:: A look at the intersection of journalism, politics and foreign affairs in India and around the world
India - Sri Lanka: Expanding on the Shades of Grey
Here is the link to the text of my article that was published by www.ipcs.org on 4 April 2014:
Shades of grey in India-Sri Lanka ties: Time for reshaping India's neighbourhood policy
This article was published by www.rediff.com on 28 March 2014 under the headline "Time for reshaping India's neighbourhood policy" and by www.atimes.com on 31 March 2014 under the headline "UN vote shows strains in Delhi's diplomacy":
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| President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India |
Abstaining from voting on a UNHRC resolution on Sri Lanka was dictated as much by necessity and self-preservation as by a desire to place bilateralism at the front and centre of New Delhi’s ties with Colombo, says Ramesh Ramachandran.
In a departure from its hitherto familiar voting pattern on United Nations Human Rights Council resolutions critical of Sri Lanka, India on Thursday abstained from casting its vote on the resolution that approved an independent international investigation into certain alleged war crimes and gross human rights violations committed by the government of Sri Lanka during the 2009 civil war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
The customary ‘explanation of vote’ by the permanent representative of India to the UN offices in Geneva said, among other things, that:
* “In asking the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate, assess and monitor the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, the resolution ignores the progress already made by the country in this field and places in jeopardy the cooperation currently taking place between the government of Sri Lanka and the OHCHR and the council’s special procedures. Besides, the resolution is inconsistent and impractical in asking both the government of Sri Lanka and the OHCHR to simultaneously conduct investigations”;
* “India believes that it is imperative for every country to have the means of addressing human rights violations through robust national mechanisms. The council’s efforts should therefore be in a direction to enable Sri Lanka to investigate all allegations of human rights violations through comprehensive, independent and credible national investigative mechanisms and bring to justice those found guilty. Sri Lanka should be provided all assistance it desires in a cooperative and collaborative manner”; and
* “It has been India’s firm belief that adopting an intrusive approach that undermines national sovereignty and institutions is counterproductive.”
After having voted for the UNHRC resolutions on Sri Lanka in 2012 and 2013, India’s abstention this year is indicative of a course correction in New Delhi’s engagement with Colombo that is aimed at retrieving the ground lost in the intervening years, burnishing India’s credentials as a relevant player in the island nation’s affairs and signalling a return to bilateralism as the centrepiece of India-Sri Lanka ties (not necessarily in that order).
If India’s support for the resolutions in the previous years exposed an utter bankruptcy of ideas on how to engage with Sri Lanka (thereby implicitly admitting to a failure on the part of New Delhi to either influence the course of events or bring about the desired change in Colombo’s disposition), the abstention should be seen as a belated attempt to pull the relationship back from the brink.
Of course, it helped that the reaction from the regional parties was muted this year and that gave New Delhi extra room for manoeuvre, enabling it in the process to regain its voice vis-a-vis the states on foreign policy matters.
It needs to be said here that India cannot claim to adhere to a consistent policy towards Sri Lanka. First it nurtured the LTTE and burnt its fingers in the process. Then it extended a tacit support to Colombo -- before, during and after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in May 2009 -- only to later, in its wisdom, support the UNHRC resolution piloted by the United States. The 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting summit in Sri Lanka was as much in the news for the renewed focus on the human rights record of the host nation as for the decision by the prime minister of India not to take part in it. In his stead it was left to External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid to lead the Indian delegation for the biennial event of the 53-nation Commonwealth.
In a letter of regret that was hand-delivered to President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Singh informed Rajapaksa of his inability to attend personally but he did not assign any reasons for it. Suffice it to say that a careful reading of the history of India-Sri Lanka relations would make it evident to just about anyone that India’s policy towards this island-nation in the Indian Ocean can be described as consistently inconsistent, characterised by myopia and self-inflicted crises.
For the ministry of external affairs, what should be particularly worrying is the erosion in India’s standing, in what it calls, its sphere of influence. The recent debate over which way India should vote on a UNHRC resolution on Sri Lanka is instructive to the extent that it illustrated how far India has come from being an influential actor in its neighbourhood to being a marginal or fringe player.
Put simply (not simplistically), some of the key questions were: Is it advisable for New Delhi to vote for the resolutions and risk losing whatever goodwill and leverage it might have had with Colombo? Should not all other options have been exhausted before India (figuratively) threw in the towel and (literally) threw in its lot with the West? Thursday’s abstention has partially answered that question. However, there remains another worry:
The protestations from Tamil Nadu chief minister J Jayalalithaa and her rival and DMK patriarch M Karunanidhi over India’s vote on Sri Lanka in 2012, coming as they did a few months after West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee ‘vetoed’ an agreement on the sharing of the Teesta river waters with Bangladesh, injected a certain degree of dissonance in the conduct of foreign policy. What fuelled the diplomats’ anxiety was the precedent that would be set if the Centre caved in or succumbed to the states on matters that fell in the Union Government’s realm. Already, India’s engagement of Pakistan on one hand and China and Burma on the other are determined to an extent by the domestic conditions prevalent in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states, respectively.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh betrayed his frustration when he said in the Lok Sabha that difficult decisions were getting more difficult because of coalition compulsions. He called for bipartisanship in the interest of the country. At the same time, what cannot be denied is that there exists a view among a section of serving and former practitioners of diplomacy that devolution of foreign policy to more stakeholders than what is currently assumed should not be entirely unwelcome.
As a former foreign secretary told this writer, “Foreign policy today is made not only in New Delhi but elsewhere, too. There are multiple stakeholders and one can’t deny states a say in foreign policy if it relates to them.” In other words, it is argued that if the states assert their rights and/or seek more consultations, then the Centre must respect those sentiments.
Having said that, an impression seems to be gaining ground, erroneously at that, that foreign policy is the worst sufferer of this nouveau phenomenon of the states having their say in matters pertaining to foreign policy. A cursory look at recent years would show that the states have consistently been vocal on a host of other issues, too. The recent examples of certain states or regional parties opposing the policy of raising the cap on FDI (foreign direct investment) in single-brand retail is a case in point. As is the opposition to the Centre’s proposal for setting up a National Counter Terrorism Centre.
In some of these cases New Delhi chose to yield, albeit temporarily, but in some others it had its way. Therefore, it would not be accurate to suggest that regional influences are wielding a ‘veto’ over New Delhi. Also, it would not be fair to either paint the states as villains of the piece or to apportion all the blame for the Centre’s foreign policy woes to regional parties that are, or could be, aligned against it in the political arena.
For instance, the Centre accuses the West Bengal government headed by the Trinamool Congress party of scuttling a river waters sharing agreement with Bangladesh. However, the Congress, which heads the ruling coalition at the Centre and also in Kerala, is guilty of playing to narrow political sentiments, too, as was evidenced by the state government’s and the party’s stand on the two Italian marines who are facing murder charges for the deaths of two Indian fishermen off the Kerala coast.
On balance, it is time for reshaping India’s neighbourhood policy in a manner that it reflects the broadest possible national consensus on the way forward in reshaping ties with countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. A reset is imperative, irrespective of which coalition forms the next government in New Delhi. India can ill-afford a Pavlovian foreign policy.
Equally, framing India’s foreign policy options as a binary choice can be self-defeating. There needs to be a dispassionate debate and a greater appreciation of various shades of grey (pun unintended.)
CONSULT, NOT CONFRONT
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| President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India |
Re-posting my November 2013 piece on the CHOGM Summit and India - Sri Lanka relations (You may want to read it together with my March 2012 piece, headlined "Mamata, Karunanidhi effect: MEA sees red as states veto foreign policy"):
The recently concluded Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) summit in Sri Lanka was as much in the news for the renewed focus on the human rights record of the host nation as for the decision by the Prime Minister of India not to take part in it. In his stead it was left to External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid to lead the Indian delegation to Colombo for the biennial event of the 53-nation Commonwealth. In a letter of regret that was hand-delivered to President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka, Mr Singh informed Mr Rajapaksa of his inability to attend personally but he did not assign any reasons for it. It was the second consecutive CHOGM summit the Indian Prime Minister has skipped but not many in his own party, the Indian National Congress, or its allies are complaining. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), which was at the front and centre of a campaign in Tamil Nadu to dissuade the Prime Minister from travelling to Colombo, welcomed the move, describing it as “some consolation” to it. Some of the Prime Minister’s own colleagues in the Council of Ministers who hail from Tamil Nadu were relieved, too, after the PM acceded to the decision of the Congress core group, headed by party president Sonia Gandhi, that he must excuse himself from the summit. For its part, the Congress party was guided by the belief that while the DMK had withdrawn support to the government and pulled out from the ruling alliance in March this year, it remains a potential ally as the 2014 parliamentary elections draw near. Besides, Sri Lanka is an emotive issue that resonates with a large cross-section of the electorate in the state. As Mr Khurshid himself pointed out, the Prime Minister’s decision to skip CHOGM had been taken after factoring in a lot of issues. “The Prime Minister has taken a considerate call; he factored in a lot of issues, including the importance of his presence in the country at this time. We are after all facing five elections,” he said, before going on to concede that “there was also a very strong sentiment expressed by our colleagues in Parliament from Tamil Nadu.”
The Indian Prime Minister was not alone in giving the summit a miss. The prime ministers of Canada and Mauritius boycotted it, too. However, unlike the Canadian premier who warned of the boycott at the last CHOGM summit held in Australia in 2011, India cannot claim to adhere to a consistent policy towards Sri Lanka. First it nurtured the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and burnt its fingers in the process. Then it extended a tacit support to Colombo – before, during and after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in May 2009 – only to later, in its wisdom, support a 2011 United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution piloted by the United States and vote, in turn, against Sri Lanka. It voted against Sri Lanka a second time in the UNHRC in March this year. There can be compelling arguments for and against whether India should have supported such a resolution but it cannot be denied that those acts exposed the limits of India’s influence among its neighbours. Suffice it to say that a careful reading of the history of India-Sri Lanka relations would make it evident to just about anyone that India’s policy towards this island-nation in the Indian Ocean can be described as consistently inconsistent, characterised by myopia and self-inflicted crises.
In a federal structure such as India’s, foreign policy cannot be practised in a vacuum or in isolation or without consultations with all stakeholders concerned, including, but not limited to, the states, particularly those that share contiguous borders with neighbouring countries and/or share ethnic, linguistic, cultural or geographical affinities with them. A foreign policy drawn up in the corridors of the South Block in New Delhi may have served India well in all these decades but contemporary realities dictate that in a federal set-up and in an era of coalition governments the views of the states are factored in at the time of formulation of a foreign policy. Having said that, an impression seems to be gaining ground, erroneously at that, that foreign policy is the worst sufferer of this nouveau phenomenon of the states having their say in matters pertaining to foreign policy. A cursory look at recent years would show that the states have consistently been vocal on a host of other issues, too. The recent examples of certain states or regional parties opposing the policy of raising the cap on FDI (foreign direct investment) in single-brand retail to 100 per cent is a case in point. As is the opposition to the Centre’s proposal for setting up a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) or the protests against building nuclear power plants at Jaitapur in Maharashtra and Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu. In some of these cases New Delhi chose to yield, albeit temporarily, but in some others it had its way. Therefore, it would not be accurate to suggest that regional influences are wielding a veto over New Delhi. Also, it would not be fair to either paint the states as villains of the piece or to apportion all the blame for the Centre’s foreign policy woes to regional parties that are or could be aligned against it in the political arena. For instance, the Centre accuses the West Bengal government headed by the All India Trinamool Congress party of scuttling a river waters sharing agreement with Bangladesh. However, the Congress, which heads the ruling coalition at the Centre and also in Kerala, is guilty of playing to narrow political sentiments, too, as was evidenced by the state government’s and the party’s stand on the two Italian marines who are facing murder charges for the deaths of two Indian fishermen off the Kerala coast. That the ensuing protests and the government’s response to them were provoked in part by the fact that a crucial by-election was to take place in the state, was not lost on anyone.
What cannot be overstated is that devolution of foreign policy to more stakeholders than what is currently assumed should not be entirely unwelcome. I would go as far as to say that the democratisation of foreign policy and the salience of the states in shaping it cannot be continued to be treated as an exception; and the sooner New Delhi gets used to executing its foreign and domestic policies in a coalition with sometimes competing political interests, the better it will be for all the stakeholders concerned. The irony is unmistakable: If Colombo reasons that Sri Lanka is too small a geographical entity to be governed from the provinces or for more powers to be delegated to them, New Delhi is increasingly finding that administering foreign policy in the extant federal polity which it so recommends for Sri Lanka, coupled with the influence wielded by regional political parties or groups in a country of India’s size and history, is not easy. As recent developments indicate, policy-making cannot remain the exclusive preserve of New Delhi and it behoves of the Centre to encourage various stakeholders to air their views and to enable them to give expression to their concerns. Also, it is time for reshaping India’s neighbourhood policy in a manner that it reflects the broadest possible national consensus.
The Indian Spring: Lessons for the World
This article was first published by www.rediff.com on 30 December 2013 under the headline The Indian Spring: Lessons For The World
n The Indian Spring represented by Anna Hazare's anti-corruption campaign, which has culminated in the Aam Aadmi Party's impressive electoral debut, began around the same time as the Arab Spring in 2011 but they led to different outcomes. A comparison:
n The Indian Spring represented by Anna Hazare's anti-corruption campaign, which has culminated in the Aam Aadmi Party's impressive electoral debut, began around the same time as the Arab Spring in 2011 but they led to different outcomes. A comparison:
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| A scene from an anti-corruption protest in India |
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| A photograph from the Arab Spring |
New Delhi
28 December 2013
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n 17 December 2013, as Tunisians observed the third anniversary of the self-immolation of a 26-year-old street vendor Mohd Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid that sparked protests in their country and triggered a wave of similar uprisings across North Africa and West Asia, people of Delhi broke out into celebrations for the second time in less than 10 days. A rank outsider, 45-year-old Arvind Kejriwal had just announced a referendum of sorts to ascertain the people’s wishes on whether his Aam Aadmi (common man) Party should take the lead for forming a government or not, after the fledgling party made a historic debut in the recently concluded provincial elections winning 28 seats in the 70-member Assembly and coming second behind BJP and its allies (32) but far ahead of the Congress’s tally of eight seats. Less than a week later, Kejriwal had staked claim to form the government, bringing to a successful culmination an unprecedented experiment in Indian democracy and bringing cheer to ordinary citizens who had had enough of the corruption and inflation that had peaked of late.
The contrast between Sidi Bouzid, a town 260 kilometres southwest of capital Tunis, and a Delhi located 6,000-odd km away, could not have been starker. Three years after the first stirrings of the Arab Spring, Tunisia – much like the rest of the Arab world – is still coming to terms with the contagion that was unleashed on an unsuspecting society and government alike. But the Indian version of the Arab Spring that began with a septuagenarian anti-corruption crusader Anna Hazare’s fast at Jantar Mantar in Delhi on 5 April 2011 can draw satisfaction from the many successes it has notched up on the way. There is a sense of accomplishment in the air. The spontaneous public movement that captured the imagination of men and women, young and old, in cities and towns across much of India has finally paid dividends. Not only does India today have a new Lokpal Bill that provides for a nationwide anti-corruption ombudsman, Hazare’s one-time protégé Kejriwal has turned a people’s movement for good governance, transparency and accountability into a political party with a remarkable felicity of democratic expression. That this was achieved without any blood-letting is a tribute to the virtues of democracy in general and the sagacity and maturity of the Indian voter in particular. Compare this with the less than two lakh people killed in the Arab Spring, including, but not limited to, 300 in Tunisia, 1,700 in Egypt, 2,000 in Yemen, 25,000 in Libya, 1.2 lakh in Syria and over 100 in Bahrain, all of which are yet nowhere close to overcoming the challenges such as corruption, unemployment, inflation and inequality that bedevils Sidi Bouzid as much as it does Chandni Chowk. The events that unfolded in those countries brought home the tragic consequences of choosing the bullet over the ballot.
The phenomenon sweeping across much of the Arab world did not leave democratic societies such as the United States, where the Occupy Wall Street movement gained traction, or India, untouched. No country was immune from its reach. Social media ensured that the word spread farther and anger travelled faster. It sprouted wherever it found a ground made fertile by misgovernance. It spared neither the dictator nor the democrat. Five governments were overthrown, including two in Egypt, just as the ruling Congress party was ousted from power in the province of Delhi but, unlike India and the US, the levels of disenchantment continue to remain high in the democracy-deficit countries in North Africa and West Asia. The prevailing sentiment in Tunisia, which has seen changes wrought by the Arab Spring, is that people’s lives and their economic situation has improved only marginally but it is not likely to improve any further in the immediate future. Tunisia is likely to witness the approval of a new constitution and the holding of parliamentary elections in 2014. In a recent study conducted by researchers from the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research and the University of Maryland in the United States, more than 60 per cent of the 3,000 Tunisian adults surveyed said that they are not happy with the current political leadership and 86 per cent said that corruption is common. The situation is worse in Egypt, which increasingly resembles a police state, or, Libya, where militias run amok, throwing the country into further instability. In Yemen, attempts are still being made for a national dialogue and reconciliation involving multiple stakeholders. “It is clear that the process of Arab transformation will need decades to mature and that its success is by no means guaranteed,” says Marwan Muasher, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the oldest international affairs think tank in the United States. Muasher’s prognosis for some of the countries affected by the Arab Spring is not encouraging. According to him, Egypt, which can be expected to hold a referendum on a new constitution in addition to presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014, “is not out of the woods yet.” He sounds a warning for the Arab monarchies who have not succeeded in tackling the underlying political, economic, and social challenges their nations face. “Jordan will continue to feel that it has successfully ridden the wave of Arab transitions without seriously addressing some of the key economic and political challenges facing the country. And it will probably get away with it, at least for now,” notes Muasher, who served as Jordan’s deputy prime minister from 2004 to 2005 and foreign minister from 2002 to 2004.
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t the same time, the Aam Aadmi Party’s ascension to the front and centre of the political landscape and discourse is instructive for a proud democracy such as India. We are seeing Kejriwal’s fourth avatar, this time as a politician, after the engineer-turned-bureaucrat quit government service to launch a non-government organisation (NGO.) He was in every sense of the word an antithesis to the reticent and self-effacing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who for many had come to symbolise some if not everything that was wrong with the government and governance. By any reckoning, the recently concluded elections in Delhi that catapulted the Aam Aadmi Party to centrestage had to be among the most secular electoral contests in recent memory because it was fought on the twin issues of corruption and good governance, and these are as secular an issue as secular gets. The usual considerations of caste, sect or religion were trumped by the near universal outrage against corruption. Contrast this with many of the countries affected by the Arab Spring which descended into sectarianism, majoritarianism or plain terrorism; where people still yearn for the rule of law and many of the personal freedoms and human rights that many around the world take for granted. The Indian Spring also took under its wing issues other than corruption, such as crimes against women. The common man was once again at the forefront of the apolitical, secular protests following the 16 December 2012 gang rape of a young woman in Delhi. The Indian Street, similar to the Arab Street, had well and truly begun to take spape. The unprecedented outrage forced Parliament to pass the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill to tighten the legal framework against rape. Women have found the voice to assert themselves like never before. It has led to the arrest of a magazine editor on charges of rape and a retired Supreme Court judge finds himself at the centre of a row over the alleged sexual harassment of a law intern. Having said that, if the groundswell of opinion in favour of the Aam Aadmi Party in Delhi extends to even some of the other states of Indian Union and/or the mandate decisively shifts away from the two blocs led by the Congress and the BJP to regional parties, then the 2014 parliamentary elections could throw up a more representative government bringing in its wake certain implications for the economic and foreign policies of India. Be it 51 per cent foreign direct investment (FDI) in multi-brand retail; policies vis-à-vis Pakistan, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka; National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC); or setting up of new nuclear power plants, what cannot be overstated is that devolution of economic or foreign policies to more stakeholders than what is currently assumed should not be entirely unwelcome. In a federal structure such as India’s, foreign policy in particular cannot be practised in a vacuum or in isolation or without consultations with all stakeholders concerned, including, but not limited to, the states, particularly those that share contiguous borders with neighbouring countries and/or share ethnic, linguistic, cultural or geographical affinities with them. A foreign policy drawn up in the corridors of the South Block in New Delhi may have served India well in all these decades but contemporary realities dictate that in a federal set-up and in an era of coalition governments the views of the states are factored in at the time of formulation of a foreign policy. The democratisation of policy-making and the salience of the states in shaping it cannot be continued to be treated as an exception; and the sooner New Delhi gets used to executing its foreign and domestic policies in a coalition with sometimes competing political interests, the better it will be for all the stakeholders concerned.
At the time of writing, protests reminiscent of the Arab Spring are happening in Thailand, where at least five have died so far, and Ukraine. The international community could draw the right lessons from the Indian Spring, which spawned the rise of the Aam Aadmi Party. It has stirred even a 128-year-old party such as the Congress from its complacency and put others on notice. The three-time chief minister of Delhi, who had derisively asked “Who is Arvind Kejriwal? What is [Aam Aadmi Party]?” on election day, got her answer four days later when the votes were counted and how: Her party had been trounced and she herself had lost the election from her constituency. All of which can only mean one thing for political parties and governments everywhere: Thou shalt not mistreat the common man.
REMOVE THE BLINKERS
This article was published by Asia Times Online (www.atimes.com) on 17 October 2013 under the headline: "Singh takes a lonely road on Pakistan". Here is the link to it.
New Delhi
16 October 2013
The Prime Minister of India met with his Pakistan counterpart on the margins of the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 29 September 2013, defying public sentiment and in spite of an overwhelming body of evidence of Pakistan’s complicity in allowing its territory to be used for mounting terrorist attacks against India and Indian interests, at home and abroad alike. The discourse leading up to the meeting was dominated by whether the talks should at all be held in the immediate backdrop of the 26 September 2013 twin terror attacks in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in which Indian soldiers, police personnel and civilians were killed. It was not an isolated incident: In January this year an Indian soldier was beheaded at the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan; in August five more Indian soldiers were killed; and, in between, several more such killings and infiltrations were reported. As it became known later, the Indian Army was engaged in an operation to repulse an attempt from the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) to push a tranche of infiltrators across the Line of Control even as the two premiers shook hands and posed for the cameras. It took the army a fortnight to successfully conclude the anti-infiltration operation. If the government dithered on calling Pakistan’s bluff, the army chief made it eminently clear to anyone who would care to listen that it is impossible for terrorists to carry out any activity along the LoC without the knowledge of the Pakistani Army.
By the Indian government’s own admission, the expectations from the New York talks had to be toned down given the terror arm which is still active in the Indian subcontinent. And as it predictably turned out, there was not much to show by way of outcomes except for the two sides deciding to task their respective Directors-General of Military Operations (DGMOs) to meet for suggesting effective means to restore the ceasefire. Even that looks remote now. The two DGMOs last met in 1999 although they speak fairly regularly. The New York meeting could at best be described as a photo-op. If anything, it once again reaffirmed Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s, and by extension his government’s, adamantly consistent but questionable position on talks with Pakistan. After the 26 November 2008 Mumbai attacks, too, he had similarly disregarded public opinion to first meet with the then President of Pakistan at Yekaterinburg in Russia on the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, and later with the then Prime Minister of Pakistan at the Red Sea resort of Sharm-el-Sheikh in Egypt on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit. It was at Sharm-el-Sheikh that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his team agreed to a joint statement with Pakistan that said: “Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue Process and these should not be bracketed”. Also, in another first, Balochistan was allowed to creep into the text of an India - Pakistan joint statement. Pakistan has since conveniently used the bogey of Indian involvement in stirring up trouble in Balochistan as a stock response to India’s assertions of a Pakistani hand in fomenting unrest in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.
All of which begs the question: Talks to what end, and at what cost? Is the life of an Indian – be it a soldier or a civilian — so cheap that talks with Pakistan should continue at any cost and in spite of a spate of terrorist attacks, as evidenced most recently in the twin terror attacks in the Samba and Kathua sectors of Jammu and Kashmir? How many more brave Indian soldiers should be killed in cowardly terrorist attacks before the decision-making apparatuses of the government proactively seek out the military’s views? How many more families should lose their loved ones at the hands of the terrorists and their masters outside our borders before the government of the day begins to pay heed to the sentiments of the common man whom it claims to represent? Why are no visible attempts being made to restore the delicate civil-military balance and to uphold the dignity and morale of the soldier? Instead, what we are witnessing today is a government that is playing with fire and it needs to stop now. External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid has since clarified that while the two Prime Ministers met in New York the stage has not been reached where the two sides have indicated any dates, timeline or perspective on resuming the dialogue. And with a post-2014 Afghanistan looming large on the horizon it is anyone’s guess as to how much time and effort Pakistan, given its proclivities, will be willing to spare and/or invest in preserving the incremental peace dividends and insulating the bilateral relationship from external influences.
What the discerning stakeholders in India today need be understand is that this government’s blind faith in dialogue with Pakistan has not disproved those who have little or no faith in talks under the present circumstances. The history of India – Pakistan bilateral engagement over the past decade and more is replete with an unending series of terrorist attacks interspersed with peace talks, an overwhelming majority of which were held in third countries on the margins of multilateral summits. The New York meeting is but one in a long list of bilateral engagements starting with the 2006 NAM summit at Havana in Cuba, the 2008 Asia –Europe Meeting (ASEM) at Beijing in China, the 2008 United Nations General Assembly session in New York, the 2009 SCO summit at Yekaterinburg in Russia, the 2009 NAM summit at Sharm-el-Sheikh and the 2010 SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) summit at Thimphu in Bhutan. Add to it former Pakistan President Gen Pervez Musharraf’s visit to New Delhi in 2005 and former Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s visit to Mohali in 2011 for watching cricket or the private visits by Pakistani heads of state/government to Ajmer and you have a veritably uninterrupted dialogue that can be traced further back to Lahore, 1999; Agra, 2001; and Islamabad, 2004. Importantly, these bilateral engagements have survived multiple terrorist attacks and conflicts dating back to Kargil and Kandahar in 1999, Parliament in 2001, Mumbai train bombings of 2006 and the 26/11 terrorist attacks again in Mumbai, in 2008. But what has come of the talks so far? Are we any closer to a breakthrough than we were before? Have terrorist attacks diminished appreciably? Unfortunately, after every terrorist attack the government of the day mouths platitudes and employs boilerplate language such as ‘It cannot be business as usual’ or ‘Patience is not inexhaustible’ only to go back on them at the first available opportunity! This government has tied itself in knots over its Pakistan policy but it has only itself to blame for it. Its inability to think out of the box has exposed its bankruptcy of ideas on how to deal with an increasingly intransigent neighbour. And Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s personal quest for a lasting legacy insofar as Pakistan is concerned has only further compounded an already intractable conundrum.
The government needs to remove its blinkers and begin to appreciate that terrorism and talks cannot go hand in hand. It is imperative that the government shows zero tolerance to terrorism, takes strong steps to prevent terror attacks and imposes costs on the perpetrators of terrorism. Most importantly, the government must heed public opinion. The time has come for the government to start calling Pakistan’s bluff, to act firmly and decisively and if that involves putting a moratorium on future talks with Pakistan at the highest level, “so be it.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has used this specific language before, albeit to a domestic audience in the run up to the India – United States nuclear cooperation agreement in his first term in office when the Left parties parted ways with the UPA; there is no reason why in the instant context Pakistan cannot be told “So be it”; that India will be free to pursue its course of action if Pakistan does not intend to reciprocate peace overtures; and that consequences will follow if it does not give satisfaction to India on what India considers to be its core interests. Saying no to talks now is not the same as saying no to talks ever and it certainly need not necessarily mean or come to represent an escalation of tensions. A range of other equally effective options is available to the government of the day to execute its Pakistan policy and these must be explored. Above all, the government must forge the broadest possible national consensus on the way forward for a détente with Pakistan.
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| Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in a bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif in New York on 29 September 2013 (Pictures courtesy: www.pmindia.nic.in) |
New Delhi
16 October 2013
The Prime Minister of India met with his Pakistan counterpart on the margins of the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 29 September 2013, defying public sentiment and in spite of an overwhelming body of evidence of Pakistan’s complicity in allowing its territory to be used for mounting terrorist attacks against India and Indian interests, at home and abroad alike. The discourse leading up to the meeting was dominated by whether the talks should at all be held in the immediate backdrop of the 26 September 2013 twin terror attacks in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in which Indian soldiers, police personnel and civilians were killed. It was not an isolated incident: In January this year an Indian soldier was beheaded at the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan; in August five more Indian soldiers were killed; and, in between, several more such killings and infiltrations were reported. As it became known later, the Indian Army was engaged in an operation to repulse an attempt from the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) to push a tranche of infiltrators across the Line of Control even as the two premiers shook hands and posed for the cameras. It took the army a fortnight to successfully conclude the anti-infiltration operation. If the government dithered on calling Pakistan’s bluff, the army chief made it eminently clear to anyone who would care to listen that it is impossible for terrorists to carry out any activity along the LoC without the knowledge of the Pakistani Army.
By the Indian government’s own admission, the expectations from the New York talks had to be toned down given the terror arm which is still active in the Indian subcontinent. And as it predictably turned out, there was not much to show by way of outcomes except for the two sides deciding to task their respective Directors-General of Military Operations (DGMOs) to meet for suggesting effective means to restore the ceasefire. Even that looks remote now. The two DGMOs last met in 1999 although they speak fairly regularly. The New York meeting could at best be described as a photo-op. If anything, it once again reaffirmed Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s, and by extension his government’s, adamantly consistent but questionable position on talks with Pakistan. After the 26 November 2008 Mumbai attacks, too, he had similarly disregarded public opinion to first meet with the then President of Pakistan at Yekaterinburg in Russia on the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, and later with the then Prime Minister of Pakistan at the Red Sea resort of Sharm-el-Sheikh in Egypt on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit. It was at Sharm-el-Sheikh that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his team agreed to a joint statement with Pakistan that said: “Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue Process and these should not be bracketed”. Also, in another first, Balochistan was allowed to creep into the text of an India - Pakistan joint statement. Pakistan has since conveniently used the bogey of Indian involvement in stirring up trouble in Balochistan as a stock response to India’s assertions of a Pakistani hand in fomenting unrest in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.
All of which begs the question: Talks to what end, and at what cost? Is the life of an Indian – be it a soldier or a civilian — so cheap that talks with Pakistan should continue at any cost and in spite of a spate of terrorist attacks, as evidenced most recently in the twin terror attacks in the Samba and Kathua sectors of Jammu and Kashmir? How many more brave Indian soldiers should be killed in cowardly terrorist attacks before the decision-making apparatuses of the government proactively seek out the military’s views? How many more families should lose their loved ones at the hands of the terrorists and their masters outside our borders before the government of the day begins to pay heed to the sentiments of the common man whom it claims to represent? Why are no visible attempts being made to restore the delicate civil-military balance and to uphold the dignity and morale of the soldier? Instead, what we are witnessing today is a government that is playing with fire and it needs to stop now. External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid has since clarified that while the two Prime Ministers met in New York the stage has not been reached where the two sides have indicated any dates, timeline or perspective on resuming the dialogue. And with a post-2014 Afghanistan looming large on the horizon it is anyone’s guess as to how much time and effort Pakistan, given its proclivities, will be willing to spare and/or invest in preserving the incremental peace dividends and insulating the bilateral relationship from external influences.
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| Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in a bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif in New York on 29 September 2013. Also seen in the picture (on the right) are External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon and Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh |
The government needs to remove its blinkers and begin to appreciate that terrorism and talks cannot go hand in hand. It is imperative that the government shows zero tolerance to terrorism, takes strong steps to prevent terror attacks and imposes costs on the perpetrators of terrorism. Most importantly, the government must heed public opinion. The time has come for the government to start calling Pakistan’s bluff, to act firmly and decisively and if that involves putting a moratorium on future talks with Pakistan at the highest level, “so be it.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has used this specific language before, albeit to a domestic audience in the run up to the India – United States nuclear cooperation agreement in his first term in office when the Left parties parted ways with the UPA; there is no reason why in the instant context Pakistan cannot be told “So be it”; that India will be free to pursue its course of action if Pakistan does not intend to reciprocate peace overtures; and that consequences will follow if it does not give satisfaction to India on what India considers to be its core interests. Saying no to talks now is not the same as saying no to talks ever and it certainly need not necessarily mean or come to represent an escalation of tensions. A range of other equally effective options is available to the government of the day to execute its Pakistan policy and these must be explored. Above all, the government must forge the broadest possible national consensus on the way forward for a détente with Pakistan.
Post-2014 Afghanistan: Back to the Future?
New Delhi
28 July 2013
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| Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan |
As Afghanistan prepares for life beyond 2014 its capital Kabul is seeing a steady stream of visitors from far and near, all seeking to reassure and to be reassured themselves that peace and stability will return to the landlocked country torn apart by conflict for the last 33 years. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd paid a surprise visit to Afghanistan on July 27; his country has about 1,500 troops there but the bulk will be pulled out by the end of this year. Security and Foreign Affairs Adviser Sartaj Aziz of Pakistan and British premier David Cameron were there, too, as was the US’s Af-Pak envoy James Dobbins. An Indian delegation comprising officials from the ministries of external affairs and defence travelled to Kabul in the second week of July to follow up on Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s visit to New Delhi in the month of May with a wish list of items he would like the Indian government to share with the Afghan national army and allied security forces as the US completes pulling out its troops by the end of next year.
necessary capabilities – including capacity for logistics and equipment maintenance as well as adequate ground and air firepower – to execute independent operations against conventional and unconventional enemies. India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement in October 2011, which dwelled on security, trade, capacity-building and people-to-people contacts. Specifically, India agreed "to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces". Therefore, Kabul’s desire to source hardware with Indian assistance should be viewed in that context. But if the Afghans were disappointed by New Delhi’s circumspection, they did not show it. As Afghan ambassador to India Shaida Abdali put it, “In the post 2014 period, we look forward to working with India .... At the same time, we renew our call on the international community to stay the course in Afghanistan.”
What should have been a moment of quiet satisfaction, reflective of the enormous goodwill India enjoys among the Afghan people and government alike for funding development projects worth billions of dollars, has turned into an embarrassment of sorts as President Karzai’s wish list has exposed the limits to what India can, and is willing to, do to shore up a post-2014 Afghanistan. It was quick to waitlist Karzai’s inventory of lethal materiel rpt materiel on the ground that there are many moving parts to the Afghan conundrum, namely Pakistan’s attitude towards Afghanistan and India, the Taliban’s own game plan, the moves for a possible reconciliation with the Taliban (as evidenced by the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar) and the extent of Pakistan’s role in it, the ethnic configuration of Afghanistan in the immediate future and last but not the least the eventual successor to Mr Karzai following the elections.
Notwithstanding New Delhi’s contention that while it is there for the long haul it would not want to “become part of the problem”, Kabul maintains that the Afghan national security forces must be equipped with the
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| A map of Afghanistan (for illustrative purposes only) |
So could Afghanistan descend into chaos after 2014? While jury is still out on that, serving and former Afghan officials are of the considered view that the road to peace in Kabul goes through Islamabad. An Afghan diplomatic source insists that the Taliban leadership continues to receive protection from the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments. Afghan army chief General Sher Mohammad Karimi believes that Pakistan could end the Afghan war "in weeks" because “the Taliban are under their control". A former Afghan intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh, in turn, says that some of the Western powers are in such a hurry to cut and run from Afghanistan that they are eager to differentiate between the threats posed by the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda and to downplay the dangers posed by a return of the Taliban (similar to how the chaos after the erstwhile USSR’s withdrawal from Afghanistan gave rise to the Taliban.) Ironically, this view is in contrast to New Delhi’s which has of late adopted a nuanced position on the issue of reconciliation with the Taliban; at a recent Asean meeting in Brunei External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid said India supported Kabul’s efforts to establish a dialogue with all armed opposition groups, “including the Taliban”. For now, Abdali is confident that his country will not go the Iraq way from where the US troops withdrew in December 2011 but which continues to be riven by civil strife, or, resemble the days of the Taliban rule between 1996 and 2001. “Let me assure you against the 2014 myth of Afghanistan falling apart after the withdrawal of NATO forces from our country,” says Abdali. Watch this space!
INDIA WAITLISTS KARZAI'S WISH LIST !
Karzai, Singh discuss roadmap for 2014 and beyond
New Delhi
21 May 2013
The situation that will obtain in Afghanistan after the presidential elections in April 2014 and the subsequent withdrawal of international troops from the country before that year ends, not to mention the protection of Indian interests and investments made in the war-ravaged, landlocked country over the years, would have weighed on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s mind as he hosted President Hamid Karzai for talks in New Delhi on Tuesday. That, when taken together with President Karzai’s stated desire to broaden and deepen security ties with India, including, but not limited to, the supply of weapons and other military hardware for the Afghan forces, set this round of talks apart from previous ones. Afghan ambassador to India Shaida Abdali prefaced the Karzai-Singh meeting by asserting that “we would like to go beyond the current trend of co-operation between the two countries in the defence sector. So, we would like to have both lethal and non-lethal assistance to our defence forces in Afghanistan.”
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) were not forthcoming with details on the Karzai-Singh talks. It was left to Rashtrapati Bhavan to articulate India’s views which it did by putting out a press statement quoting President Pranab Mukherjee as telling his Afghan counterpart that India was prepared to increase bilateral contribution to Afghanistan’s institution-building, training and equipment “to the extent [it] can” and that India would stand by Afghanistan during its critical period of transition. Earlier in the day, External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid told journalists that India was already assisting Afghanistan with doing capacity-building, non-lethal military hardware, communication and transport equipment. “He (Karzai) may have a wish list and with which he may go to our Prime Minister but these are ongoing... which will all be discussed within the parameters of what our capacity is, what our philosophy is, we would help them as a friend,” Khurshid elaborated.
President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan shakes hands with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi on Tuesday (Picture courtesy: Prime Minister's Office)
21 May 2013
The situation that will obtain in Afghanistan after the presidential elections in April 2014 and the subsequent withdrawal of international troops from the country before that year ends, not to mention the protection of Indian interests and investments made in the war-ravaged, landlocked country over the years, would have weighed on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s mind as he hosted President Hamid Karzai for talks in New Delhi on Tuesday. That, when taken together with President Karzai’s stated desire to broaden and deepen security ties with India, including, but not limited to, the supply of weapons and other military hardware for the Afghan forces, set this round of talks apart from previous ones. Afghan ambassador to India Shaida Abdali prefaced the Karzai-Singh meeting by asserting that “we would like to go beyond the current trend of co-operation between the two countries in the defence sector. So, we would like to have both lethal and non-lethal assistance to our defence forces in Afghanistan.”
Kabul maintains that the Afghan national security forces must be equipped with the necessary capabilities – including capacity for logistics and equipment maintenance as well as adequate ground and air firepower – to execute independent operations against conventional and unconventional enemies. India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement in October 2011, which dwelled on security, trade, capacity-building and people-to-people contacts. Specifically, India agreed "to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces". Therefore, Kabul’s desire to source hardware with Indian assistance must be viewed in that context.
According to Ashraf Haidari, deputy chief of mission of the Afghan embassy in India who has served as Afghanistan’s deputy assistant national security adviser and deputy chief of mission of the Afghan embassy in the US, “the Taliban leadership continues to receive protection from the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments.” He buttressed his argument by pointing out that “without an external sanctuary, sustainable funding, weapons supplies, and intelligence support in Pakistan, the Taliban would be unable to reconsolidate its control over Afghanistan. Since 2003, the Taliban and its affiliated networks have gradually expanded their influence in the ungoverned southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, launching daily terrorist attacks that have injured and killed thousands of innocent civilians.”
While India was expected to lend a sympathetic ear to President Karzai, how soon and to what extent will it be able to satisfy Afghanistan on this count will be a function of India's own assessment of the unfolding situation situation in the Af-Pak region. Adding to New Delhi’s anxieties is that there are many moving parts to the Afghan conundrum, namely Pakistan’s attitude towards Afghanistan and India, the Taliban’s own gameplan, the moves for a possible reconciliation with the Taliban and the extent of Pakistan’s role in it, the possibility of a greater Chinese involvement subsequent to the US pullout, the ethnic configuration of Afghanistan in the immediate future and last but not the least the eventual successor to Mr Karzai following the presidential elections to be held in April 2014. That may explain India’s circumspection, as evidenced by the Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson’s remarks that while Afghanistan is a “strategically important” neighbour, India will “continue to discuss and respond to specific requests of the Afghan government ... within our own modest means as a developing country”.
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| President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan holds talks with President Pranab Mukherjee (Courtesy: Government of India) |
From President Karzai’s perspective there are three other issues that continue to engage his government’s attention. One is the tensions with Pakistan on the Durand Line, which has been cited by Karzai’s spokesman Aimal Faizi on more than one occasion. The second is the recognition that Afghanistan is vulnerable to transnational security threats, stemming in particular from the narcotics trade and terrorism. The third issue, which is of a more immediate concern to his government, is the lack of coordination among international donors or partners. Although the diversity of nations present in Afghanistan demonstrates international goodwill and consensus for supporting the country, Kabul feels each contributing nation has pursued its own aid strategies, effectively bypassing coordination with each other and the Afghan government. Hence, a lack of strategic coordination across international military and civilian efforts to ensure aid effectiveness has so far crippled the Afghan state and left it with no capacity or resources to deliver basic services to its people.
For landlocked Afghanistan, access to a sea port is particularly vital. This specific need can be met to a certain extent by India’s collaboration with Iran for developing the Chabahar port and linking it to Afghanistan by a network of roads. At the same time, Kabul is acutely aware that its location should help it serve as a regional trade and transit hub for easy movement of goods and natural resources to meet the rising energy demands of India and China. Incidentally, Afghanistan was discussed at some length by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh when they met on Monday. India has also been discussing Afghanistan with a host of other countries in the region and beyond, notably Iran, Russia and the US, besides international fora.
It was President Karzai’s 12th visit to India, and the second in the last six months. He paid a courtesy call on President Pranab Mukherjee and addressed industry representatives, too. In his address to the captains of Indian industry, President Karzai called for Indian investments in healthcare, agriculture and telecommunications in Afghanistan. He pointed out that agriculture was a priority sector for Afghanistan as it accounts for 36 per cent of its GDP and supports 85 per cent of the Afghan population. Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmai Rassoul, Afghanistan ambassador to India Shaida Abdali, Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan Gautam Mukhopadhaya and other senior officials were present on the occasion.
Video of President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan's meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi on Tuesday (Courtesy: Prime Minister's Office)
Indians see China as a threat and an opportunity, welcome stronger India-US ties: Poll
New Delhi
20 May 2013
More Indians saw China as a security threat but opinion was divided on whether India should join other countries to limit China’s influence or cooperate with China to play a leading role in the world, according to an opinion poll conducted by the Lowy Institute for International Policy and the Australia India Institute which was released at a function hosted by the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi on Monday. The survey was conducted late last year, before the incursion by Chinese troops into Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir threatened a delicate peace at the Sino-Indian border.
The ORF said in a statement that the poll revealed multiple reasons for the mistrust between India and China, including China’s possession of nuclear weapons, competition for resources in third countries, China’s efforts to strengthen relations with other countries in the Indian Ocean region and the India-China border dispute. Although China has become India’s largest trading partner, only 31 per cent of Indians agreed that China’s rise has been good for India. On India’s response to China’s rise, 65 per cent agreed that India should join other countries to limit China’s influence. At the same time, 64 per cent agreed that India should cooperate with China to play a leading role in the world.
In contrast, only 31 per cent saw the US as a security threat; also, 83 per cent wanted the India-US relations to be strong.
An overwhelming majority of 94 per cent Indians saw Pakistan as a threat, citing terrorism as a major reason. The other reasons were that the Pakistani army sees India as an enemy; Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; and Pakistan’s sovereignty claims over Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan ranked lowest in terms of warmth of feeling in the list of 22 countries surveyed. At 62 degrees (on a scale of one to 100), Indians felt most warmly towards the US. China ranked in the middle along with Brazil at 44 degrees; the US, Singapore, Japan, Australia, France, Nepal, Russia, the UK, Sri Lanka and South Africa ranked higher.
Significantly, the findings suggested that if Prime Minister Manmohan Singh were to hold a summit with Nawaz Sharif, prime minister-designate of Pakistan, today, he would have popular support among a majority of Indians. However, it must be reiterated that the survey was conducted last year, before the incidents of torture and murder of Indian prisoners Sarabjit Singh and Chamel Singh and the beheading of an Indian soldier by Pakistan vitiated the atmosphere.
Corruption, democracy, domestic policy and other issues also figured in the poll, which was conducted last year between August 30 and October 15.
Speaking on the occasion of the release of the survey’s report, Information and Broadcasting Minister Manish Tewari said he was sceptical of opinion polls but “India Poll 2013” was worth reading as it red flags various indicators and coming as it did two days ahead of completion of nine years of the UPA government. Mr Tewari criticised the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) for exaggerating the extent of corruption. “When institutions start indulging in fiction writing, that is the greatest disservice that can possibly be done to the nation,” he said. “I think the CAG in the past six years, with due respect to him, has done the greatest disservice to the nation by tossing mystical numbers into the open space.”
ORF Director Sunjoy Joshi moderation a discussion based on the findings of the survey. Participating in it, Dr C. Raja Mohan or ORF said many of the assumptions in the drafting of foreign policy would have to change following the results of the poll. He said there should be a redoubled peace initiative with Pakistan. Mr Ashok Malik, a political commentator, in turn said that the fact that 42 per cent Indians have said the central and state governments had been unfair to the Kashmiris showed that a confident Indian society was emerging.
// HIGHLIGHTS //
Findings of the “India Poll 2013: Facing the future” opinion poll:
* 83 per cent Indians consider China as a security threat
* 63 per cent Indians would like relations with China to strengthen
* 31 per cent Indians agree that China’s rise has been good for India
* 65 per cent Indians want India to join other countries to limit China’s influence
* 64 per cent Indians want India to cooperate with China to play a leading role in the world
* 83 per cent want strong India-US relations
* 31 per cent see the US as a security threat
India and China in the Arctic: The New Great Game?
New Delhi
16 May 2013
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nergy rivalry took India and China first to Central Asia and then to Africa. Now, they are scrambling for resources in the icy slopes of the Arctic. On Wednesday, the two Asian giants were made observers in the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States. It caps a concerted effort by India to reach out to the Nordic countries such as Iceland, whose president visited New Delhi in April this year.
The polar region located at the northernmost part of the Earth is the new “hot” real estate; and it is only getting hotter, quite literally, due to climate change and global warming. Melting ice caps are posing problems for the indigenous peoples of the Arctic, who fear for their livelihood and future; but at the same time they are presenting opportunities like never before by opening up new sea lanes of transport and communication and making it possible to tap hitherto inaccessible reserves of oil, gas and minerals.
As the Arctic becomes navigable it is opening up new avenues for mining, commercial exploitation of marine resources and maritime commerce. And as is the wont of human history, politics manifests itself when scientific, economic and other interests collide; so it is with the freezing environs of the Arctic too where competing geostrategies make intergovernmental cooperation manifestly imperative. This is where the Arctic Council comes in: It intends to bring various stakeholders together for evolving a code for addressing the issues of equity, territorial integrity, sovereignty and national security.
Unlike the Antarctica, which is governed by the Antarctic Treaty System of 1961 (India is a consultative party since 1983), the Arctic is only now beginning to occupy the attention of nation-states near and far and everybody, it seems, wants to have a say in who gets what and under what conditions. In other words, no one wants a free-for-all for the world’s last resources ! According to the US Government estimates, 13 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 per cent of the world’s undiscovered gas deposits can be found in the Arctic. And given its burgeoning appetite for natural resources it is only natural and inevitable too that China will become interested in the region.
Picture courtesy: Deutsche Welle
The Communist state is eyeing the Arctic region for many reasons, including, but not limited to, the fact that a northern sea route will reduce its dependence on shipping oil and gas from West Asia through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca; also, it will reduce transportation costs between Asia and Europe / the US. Not to mention the commercial benefits that will accrue in terms of mining and ports. In September 2012 China expanded its presence in the Arctic when its icebreaking vessel crossed the Arctic waters for the very first time. There is much at stake for India, too. Energy security is a prime motivation for venturing into the Arctic but renewable energy and pursuit of scientific and technological studies are equally important. Already, India is a participant in the ongoing research in the Arctic.
Welcoming the Arctic Council’s decision to grant observer status to India, the spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs iterated New Delhi’s “commitment to contribute our proven scientific expertise, particularly in polar research capabilities, to the work of the Arctic Council and to support its objectives.” For its part, China welcomed the observer status by saying that the decision made by the Arctic Council will facilitate China's communication and cooperation with relevant parties on Arctic affairs within the framework of the Council and promote promote peace, stability and sustainable development of the Arctic region. The spokesperson of the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs said, “China supports the Council's principles and purposes, recognises Arctic countries' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic region as well as their leading role in the Council and respects the values, interests, culture and tradition of the indigenous people and other people living in the Arctic region.”
The Arctic is an idea whose time has come although certain grey areas need resolution. For instance, there is little clarity on the applicability of the international Law of the Sea Convention on the new sea lanes that are opening up in what Russia and Canada consider as their backyard. Also, the right to exploit the international waters for commercial or geopolitical reasons is another point of contention.
Arctic Council logo
What is Arctic Council?
It is an intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. It was established in 1996. The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, which was adopted in 1991, is the forerunner to the Arctic Council.
Who are its members?
There are eight members: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, and the US. There are 32 observers (comprising 12 countries, 11 NGOs and nine intergovernmental and interparliamentary organisations such as United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).) The 12 countries are: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the UK, India, China, Japan, South Korea, Italy and Singapore.
What is its mandate?
The Arctic Council is a high-level forum for cooperation, coordination and interaction between Arctic states, indigenous communities and other Arctic residents on issues such as sustainable development and environmental protection. The AC provides a valuable platform for discussions on all issues of relevance to the Arctic and the people who live there. As many Arctic ecosystems cross national boundaries, international cooperation is a prerequisite for sustainable development. A key objective for the Arctic Council is to enhance discussion on and promote the integrated management of natural resource use in accordance with high environmental standards. Protection of the environment is another objective because climate change affects the cultures of the indigenous peoples and their traditional trades, such as reindeer husbandry, hunting and fishing.
Who heads it?
The chairmanship of the Arctic Council rotates every two years between the eight member states. Canada is the current chair and its two-year term will end in 2015. Leona Aglukkaq, Canada’s health minister, will act as chair during the Canadian chairmanship. Ms Aglukkaq is the first Arctic indigenous person to ever chair the Council.
What has it achieved so far?
At the 2013 biennial meeting held in Sweden, which concluded on 15 May, the Arctic Council members signed a new, legally-binding Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic which will substantially improve procedures for combating oil spills in the Arctic. At the 2011 biennial meeting held in Greenland, the Arctic Council signed an Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue agreement. It is the first legally-binding agreement negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council.
CARL BILDT, FOREIGN MINISTER OF SWEDEN, HANDS OVER THE ARCTIC COUNCIL GAVEL TO LEONA AGLUKKAQ, HEALTH MINISTER OF CANADA
Picture courtesy: Arctic Council Secretariat
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